Iqbal and Interpretation by Petroski, Karen
Saint Louis University School of Law
Scholarship Commons
All Faculty Scholarship
Winter 2012
Iqbal and Interpretation
Karen Petroski
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/faculty
Part of the Supreme Court of the United States Commons
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW 
 
 
 
IQBAL AND INTERPRETATION 
 
Karen Petroski
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VOLUME 39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WINTER 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NUMBER 2
 
Recommended citation: Karen Petroski, Iqbal and Interpretation, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 417 
(2012).  
IQBAL AND INTERPRETATION 
KAREN PETROSKI
ABSTRACT
 Assessing a year’s worth of debate over the 2009 Supreme Court decision in Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, this Article provides a novel explanation for the decision and presents it as radical 
indeed, but in a way previously unremarked by commentators. The sharp divisions in the 
responses to Iqbal have masked a deeper consensus and have blocked wide awareness of the 
decision’s constructive potential for diverse interest groups. This consensus is based on a 
simplified account of the ideal function of pleading in our system of civil litigation, one that 
first took hold in the early twentieth century. What unsettles many observers about Iqbal is 
its suggestion that district court judges must interpret a civil complaint in order to decide 
whether it states a claim. As this Article explains, however, pleading scrutiny always has 
involved interpretation; if we find that suggestion troubling, it is only because the vocabu-
lary we have long used to discuss the role and treatment of civil pleadings represses this 
fact. The Article describes the ways this vocabulary has shaped the debate over Iqbal and 
the contingent historical reasons for its dominance. Looking forward, it shows how Iqbal
makes possible a new agenda for procedural scholarship that draws from work on other 
types of legal interpretation, and it suggests some of the specific ways in which this perspec-
tive can guide implementation of Iqbal and clarification of its requirements. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
 As soon as it was issued in May 2009, the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal1 was hailed as a potential watershed in American 
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418 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:417 
civil procedure.2 On its face, Iqbal offered a clarification of the re-
quirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which applies 
to most complaints presenting civil claims in federal court. As a re-
sult, many have expected the decision to have profound systemic 
effects.3 But observers are deeply divided over what these effects 
might be, as well as over their desirability.4 Some commentators, too, 
maintain that expectations of a system-wide shift are unfounded.5
                                          
 2. See, e.g., Andrew F. Halaby, Pleading Analysis Under Iqbal: Once More Unto the 
Breach!, 46 ARIZ. ATT’Y 34, 34 (2009) (referring to Iqbal in the preface as a “watershed 
decision”); Jess Bravin, New Look at Election Spending Looms in September, WALL ST. J., 
July 1, 2009, at A4 (quoting Tom Goldstein, founder of SCOTUSblog, as stating that Iqbal
will “be the most cited Supreme Court case in a decade”); see also infra Part II, especially 
notes 47-65 and accompanying text. 
 3. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American 
Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109, 118 (2009) (stating the Court’s analysis in Iqbal is, “in 
certain types of cases, an invitation to ‘cognitive illiberalism’ ”); Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Closing the Courthouse Doors: Transcript of the 2010 Honorable James R. Browning 
Distinguished Lecture in Law, 71 MONT. L. REV. 285, 291 (2010) (describing the Iqbal
standard as “mean[ing] . . . that it all depends on the luck of the draw and who your 
district judge is”); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing 
Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 832 (2010) (describing Iqbal as “altering a defining feature 
of the legal system”); Cassidy M. Flake, Case Note, Ashcroft in a Defendant’s Wonderland: 
Redefined Pleading Standards in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 61 MERCER L. REV. 977, 992 (2010) 
(“[Iqbal] has the potential to confuse the traditional roles of judge and jury, result in the 
dismissal of many meritorious claims, and undermine the civil process of discovery.”); 
Halaby, supra note 2, at 38 (concluding that under Iqbal, “federal court plaintiffs and 
defendants seem destined to rejoin battle” on issues debated by “long-departed legions of 
lawyers whose skirmishes . . . taught us to fight our procedural battles elsewhere”); 
Goutam U. Jois, Pearson, Iqbal, and Procedural Judicial Activism, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
901, 901 (2010) (describing Iqbal, with Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009), as a 
“game changer[]” that “is fairly well known” as likely to “significantly curtail the 
availability of remedies in civil litigation”); A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in 
Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 368 (2010) (citing Iqbal as example of 
skeptical and efficiency-focused “restrictive ethos in procedure [that] appears ascendant 
and poised for dominance”); John P. Sullivan, Twombly and Iqbal: The Latest Retreat from 
Notice Pleading, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 60-61 (2009) (concluding that “real problem” 
with Iqbal is that standard “will not produce uniform results”); Rakesh N. Kilaru, 
Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal, and the Paradox of Pleading, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 905, 908 (2010) (arguing that Iqbal gives “district court judges the most powerful 
case management tool of all—a broader authority to simply dismiss a case outright”); see 
also discussion infra Part II.B, especially notes 47-52 and accompanying text. 
 4. Some expect the standard announced in Iqbal to foreclose certain classes of 
plaintiffs from civil relief. See, e.g., Jois, supra note 3, at 901; David Marcus, The Past, 
Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV.
371, 426 (2010); Alex Reinert, Procedural Barriers to Civil Rights Litigation and the 
Illusory Promise of Equity, 78 UMKC L. REV. 931, 940 (2010); Melodee C. Rhodes, The 
Battle Lines of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and the Effects on a Pro Se Litigant’s 
Inability to Survive a Motion to Dismiss, 22 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 527, 529 (2010) (arguing 
that under Iqbal, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) “violates an individual’s 
procedural due process rights by requiring a pleading standard that a layperson finds 
difficult to satisfy”); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial 
Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 
U. PA. L. REV. 517, 519 (2010); Joseph A. Seiner, After Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 179, 
192 (2010) (“Iqbal ha[s] left the requirements for pleading intentional employment-
discrimination claims in disarray . . . .”); Darwinder S. Sidhu, First Korematsu and Now
Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Latest Chapter in the Wartime Supreme Court’s Disregard for Claims 
2012]  IQBAL AND INTERPRETATION 419
 Agreeing that Iqbal is significant, this Article argues that a major 
aspect of its importance lies in its reintroduction into procedural doc-
trine of the insight that the scrutiny of civil complaints is (always) a 
matter of textual interpretation. Understanding Iqbal in this way 
dramatically realigns the debate. It supplies an entirely new way to 
understand why Iqbal was decided as it was, as well as some of the 
apparently inconsistent responses to the case. Only a few commenta-
tors have noted the tie between the type of analysis described by 
Iqbal and practices of textual interpretation. Almost without excep-
tion, these commentators have labeled the implication distressing.6
What commentators have been reluctant to address is that their 
assessments of the decision, across partisan lines, are all based on a 
long-dominant cluster of narratives about the development and function 
of pleading in civil litigation and the nature of legal interpretation.7
These narratives provide the current vocabulary for discussion of 
pleading. For complex historical reasons, the limitations of these 
narratives have remained invisible for several generations. When the 
narratives’ origins and drawbacks are recognized, Iqbal looks differ-
ent: not necessarily a disaster, but the potential beginning of a new 
and productive era for procedural scholarship and doctrine. 
 I support this claim in a three-part discussion. Part I below out-
lines the controversy over Iqbal, describing the key Supreme Court 
decisions that preceded it and reviewing the wide range of academic 
and popular responses to the decision. These responses have been 
divided not just in their evaluations of Iqbal, but also in their expla-
nations of why the Court decided the case as it did. Part II traces the 
                                                                                                
of Discrimination, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 419, 423 (2010) (arguing that Iqbal “may be one of the 
most infamous and harmful [decisions] to . . . individual rights of this generation”); 
Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting 
the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 390-91 (2010). 
 Others consider the chief flaw of the decision to be its introduction of unpredictability 
into the process of pretrial disposition of claims of all types. See infra notes 51-52 and 
accompanying text. Still others, granting these possible effects, argue that costs flowing 
from them are outweighed by the positive reforms effected by Iqbal. See, e.g., Jayne S. 
Ressler, Plausibly Pleading Personal Jurisdiction, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 627, 632 (2009) 
(arguing that the plausibility standard offers “an excellent solution to the problem of 
inefficient and costly personal jurisdiction determinations”); Victor E. Schwartz & 
Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the Modern World of Civil Litigation: The 
Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly and Iqbal, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1107, 
1110 (2010) (arguing that change in pleading standards was needed); Douglas G. Smith, 
The Evolution of a New Pleading Standard: Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 88 OR. L. REV. 1053, 1055 
(2009) (arguing that Iqbal “recognize[s] that, as the costs of litigation increase and the 
scope of discovery expands, the need for more stringent pleading standards increases”); 
Richard J. Pocker, Why the Iqbal and Twombly Decisions Are Steps in the Right Direction,
57 FED. LAW., May 2010, at 38, 38 (arguing that Iqbal is not inconsistent with prior 
practice); see also infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. 
 5. For representatives of this “agnostic” position, see infra notes 53-54 and 
accompanying text. 
 6. See infra Part II.A.3, especially notes 142-45 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra Part II. 
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common source of these diverse perspectives on Iqbal (as well as of 
the Iqbal decisions themselves): a historical-legal narrative, internalized 
by legal academics and many judges, and providing the dominant 
vocabulary for contemporary discussions of pleading. This narrative 
and vocabulary date from the first third of the twentieth century; 
they depend on the premise that in order to be fair, efficient, and 
rational, civil pleading practices cannot be focused on the text of 
complaints. This premise was originally, and self-consciously, devel-
oped as part of a pragmatic approach to procedure.  Indeed, early 
twentieth-century philosophical pragmatism influenced this legal 
framing of the function of civil complaints. But the version of prag-
matism that shaped this legal narrative was a simplification of the 
original pragmatist vision, which had sought to develop an innovative 
vocabulary for the analysis of issues of meaning and interpretation. 
As pragmatism was adopted by nonphilosophical audiences, the phi-
losophy lost this focus. In the process, it became difficult for those 
describing the function of pleading to acknowledge that trial court 
judges assessing the sufficiency of pleadings continued to treat these 
materials much as they treated other legally significant texts, even 
though earlier visions of pleading and procedure had recognized this 
connection. Together, these developments made it all but inevitable 
that something like Iqbal would come along eventually—and ensured 
that any such development would be difficult to accommodate within 
the prevailing vocabulary for discussing civil pleadings. 
 Part III considers some aspects of the new agenda that Iqbal 
makes possible when considered from this perspective. Iqbal is trou-
bling to many because it seems to propose standards for the evalua-
tion of civil complaints that are both formalistic and indeterminate. 
Commentators seeking to explain how to implement these standards 
have already turned to other areas of doctrine for models.8 This Part 
argues that some of the best resources for focusing discussion of how 
to implement these standards may be found in the doctrine developed 
to guide various aspects of legal interpretation. Consideration of the 
Iqbal “conclusoriness” standard, for example, might usefully draw on 
the conception of default rules as information-forcing devices in contract 
law and on linguistic canons of statutory interpretation; implementa-
tion of the “plausibility” standard could productively be informed by 
the extensive work done to study a partly analogous doctrine con-
                                          
 8. See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 473, 474-75 (2010) (recommending recourse to rules permitting discovery 
management); Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two 
Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power Over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 1217, 1226 (2008) (recommending recourse to summary judgment and removal 
doctrines); Michael S. Pardo, Pleadings, Proof, and Judgment: A Unified Theory of Civil 
Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1451, 1455 (2010) (outlining parallels to doctrines for 
adjudicating motions for judgment as a matter of law and summary judgment). 
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cerning administrative agency interpretations of statutes. Moving 
our understanding of civil pleading in this direction would assuage 
concerns about the subjectivity of pleading scrutiny by allowing judges 
to tie their determinations of pleading sufficiency to established 
standards. It would also restore an important, and unnecessarily 
overlooked, dimension to our vocabulary for discussing civil pleading 
and civil procedure more generally. 
II. THE IQBAL CONTROVERSY
 Most of the controversy about Iqbal concerns the relationship of 
the decision to prior law, especially prior Supreme Court decisions. 
This Part outlines this legal background, then briefly describes the 
decision itself, and finally summarizes the positions commentators 
have taken on the wisdom of Iqbal and the reasons for the decision. 
It clarifies the main fault lines dividing responses to the decision, 
and it shows how these divisions seem irreconcilable within the 
prevailing vocabulary. 
A.   What Happened? 
 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became law in 1938, creating 
for the first time a uniform set of procedural directives for all United 
States federal trial courts. Rule 8 addresses the pleading of claims 
and defenses. Section (a)(2) of that Rule, unchanged since its original 
promulgation, provides that a party presenting a claim must, to state 
it successfully, offer “a short and plain statement of the claim show-
ing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”9
 The Supreme Court first addressed the requirements of this Rule 
twenty years later in its 1957 Conley v. Gibson10 decision. Conley 
arose from a suit filed by a group of African-American railroad union 
members against their union, which had failed to represent them af-
ter their employer abolished the plaintiffs’ positions and replaced the 
plaintiffs with white employees.11 The union defendant moved to 
dismiss the complaint on two grounds: exclusive jurisdiction of the 
dispute belonged with the National Railroad Adjustment Board, and 
the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.  The lower courts approved dismissal on the first ground, 
but not on the ground of the complaint’s insufficiency.12 The Supreme 
Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Black, held that the 
                                          
 9. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). On post-1938 attempts to revise Rule 8, see Amber A. Pelot, 
Case Note, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly: Mere Adjustment or Stringent New 
Requirement in Pleading?, 59 MERCER L. REV. 1371, 1375 (2008). 
 10. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). On the details of the Conley case, see Emily Sherwin, The 
Jurisprudence of Pleading: Rights, Rules, and Conley v. Gibson, 52 HOW. L.J. 73 (2008). 
 11. Conley, 355 U.S. at 43. 
 12. Id. at 43-44. 
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complaint indicated that the core of the plaintiffs’ claims was not a 
dispute over their collective bargaining agreement (an issue that 
would have been within the Board’s exclusive jurisdiction) but an al-
legation of racial discrimination (an issue that would not be),13 and 
further that the complaint could not have been properly dismissed on 
the alternative pleading ground, since it had “adequately set forth a 
claim upon which relief could be granted” under the “accepted rule 
that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim 
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”14 The 
Conley plaintiffs had alleged that the union had protected white 
employees but not the plaintiffs, so they had alleged events that, if 
proven, would constitute a “breach of the Union’s statutory duty to 
represent . . . without hostile discrimination all of the employees in 
the bargaining unit.”15 The Court also rejected the argument that the 
complaint was deficient because it “failed to set forth specific facts to 
support its general allegations of discrimination”16:
[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to 
set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. . . . [A]ll 
the Rules require is “a short and plain statement of the claim” that 
will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is 
and the grounds upon which it rests. The illustrative forms 
appended to the Rules plainly demonstrate this. Such simplified 
“notice pleading” is made possible by the liberal opportunity for 
discovery and the other pretrial procedures established by the 
Rules to . . . define more narrowly the disputed facts and 
issues. . . . The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is 
a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to 
the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading 
is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.17
In the fifty years following this decision, courts quoted and relied on 
its “no set of facts” language more than 10,000 times18 and cited Conley
itself more than 40,000 times, making it the fourth most-cited Su-
preme Court case in American legal history by 2009.19
                                          
 13. Id. at 44-45. 
 14. Id. at 45-46 (citing Leimer v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 108 F.2d 302 (8th 
Cir. 1940)).
 15. Id. at 46. 
16. Id. at 47. 
 17. Id. at 47-48 (footnotes omitted). 
 18. See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 n.7 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 19. See Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1357-60 
(2010) (providing table of 100 most-cited Supreme Court opinions “of all time”). As of 
March 17, 2010, Twombly had become the seventh most-cited case. Id. at 1357. It was the 
most-cited Supreme Court case between June 30, 2009, and March 17, 2010; during this 
period, Iqbal was the fourth most-cited case. Id. at 1360. 
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 During this same half century, as a series of commentators noted 
starting in the 1990s, the lower federal courts’ adherence to Conley 
was not uniform.20 In certain kinds of actions, these courts appeared 
to demand more of complaints than Conley had. Responding to such 
observations, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the scope of Conley in a 
2002 decision, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.21 Akos Swierkiewicz, a 
reinsurance underwriter, had been demoted after six years of em-
ployment and replaced by a man decades younger and with far less 
experience.22 In his complaint, Swierkiewicz alleged that his employ-
er’s actions had violated federal law prohibiting discrimination on 
grounds of national origin and age; his complaint was dismissed by 
the trial court for failure to “allege[] circumstances that support an 
inference of discrimination.”23 The Supreme Court, reversing in a 
unanimous decision written by Justice Thomas, characterized the 
supporting-circumstances requirement as “an evidentiary standard, 
not a pleading requirement”24 and noted the Court’s previous refusal 
to import standards for the assessment of evidence into the pleading 
phase.25 The opinion also noted that, 
[I]mposing the . . . heightened pleading standard in employment 
discrimination cases conflicts with Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(a)(2), which provides that a complaint must include 
only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.” . . . This simplified notice pleading 
standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment 
motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of 
unmeritorious claims.26
The Court further noted that nine years earlier it had held that “[a] 
requirement of greater specificity for particular claims is a result 
that ‘must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, 
and not by judicial interpretation’ ”27 and that “Rule 8(a) establishes 
a pleading standard without regard to whether a claim will succeed 
on the merits.”28 Swierkiewicz was widely taken to clarify that the 
                                          
 20. See generally, e.g., Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ.
L. REV. 987(2003); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 1665 (1998); Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 
TEX. L. REV. 1749 (1998); see also Ryan Gist, Note, Transactional Pleading: A Proportional 
Approach to Rule 8 in the Wake of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1013, 
1015-16, 1025-31. 
 21. 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
 22. Id. at 508. 
 23. Id. at 509. 
 24. Id. at 510. 
 25. Id. at 511-12. 
 26. Id. at 512 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957)). 
27. Id. at 15 (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & 
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993), which reached a similar conclusion with 
respect to civil rights claims against municipal officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
 28. Id.
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Conley standard supplied the only acceptable terms for use in analysis 
of the sufficiency of civil claims not governed by a rule or statute 
requiring more detailed pleading, as well as that a judge’s contem-
plation of the likelihood of success of the plaintiff’s claim was inap-
propriate on motions to dismiss.29
 It was in light of this relatively recent precedent that the Supreme 
Court’s 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly30 appeared to 
depart markedly from the Court’s established approach to pleading. 
The plaintiffs in Twombly were customers of regional telephone com-
panies alleging that larger incumbent long-distance phone service 
carriers had violated federal antitrust law by conspiring to price their 
services so as to keep smaller competitors out of their respective 
markets.31 In a decision written by Justice Souter, which held that 
these plaintiffs had not stated a claim for violation of the antitrust 
statute, the Court explicitly renounced the fifty-year-old “no set of 
facts” language from Conley.32 Justice Souter justified “retirement” of 
this phrase largely based on his conclusion that courts and commen-
tators using it had been misinterpreting Conley itself. Both Conley’s 
account of Rule 8(a)(2) and later courts’ assumptions about Conley,
he argued, had been unduly narrow.33 According to Justice Souter, 
the famous Conley phrase was a gloss of only part of the text of Rule 
8(a)(2), which requires not just a “short and plain statement” but also 
a “showing” of entitlement to relief.  Such a showing, Justice Souter 
contended, could not be made “[w]ithout some factual allegation” in a 
complaint.34 This observation was the basis for Twombly’s controver-
sial requirement that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint 
must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 
                                          
 29. See, e.g., Christopher Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551 (2002). 
 30. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 31. Id. at 550-51. 
 32. Id. at 562-63. In his opinion for the majority, Justice Souter observed that the 
Conley “no set of facts” language had “earned its retirement,” id. at 563, after being 
“questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough,” id. at 562. For discussions of the 
facts of Twombly, see Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to 
Dismiss Became (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 72-78 
(2007) and Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading 
Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604, 625-36 (2007).  
33. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-63. 
 34. Id. at 555 n.3 (“Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see 
how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the 
nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”). Justice Souter also 
argued that absurd consequences would flow from treating the Conley phrase as a free-
standing principle: applying a “no set of facts” standard would seem to justify denying 
every motion to dismiss, making Rule 12(b)(6) meaningless. See id. at 561-62; see also, e.g.,
Max Huffman, The Necessity of Pleading Elements in Private Antitrust Conspiracy Claims,
10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 627, 629 (2008). 
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on its face,” or to “nudge [the plaintiff’s] claims across the line from 
conceivable to plausible.”35
 Twombly prompted great controversy, much of which will be 
summarized shortly. But the scope of its holding was not self-evident. 
On the one hand, it explicitly rejected the famous Conley language, 
long considered the default standard for pleading federal civil claims. 
On the other, some language in Twombly suggested that the “plausi-
ble” standard might apply only to complaints asserting antitrust 
claims or initiating other types of complex litigation. The Court clari-
fied these matters in Iqbal.
Iqbal arose out of events occurring shortly after the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks; the plaintiffs were noncitizens alleging viola-
tions of their federal statutory and constitutional rights during their 
detention and imprisonment after September 11.36 The defendants 
they named included then-Attorney General John Ashcroft and then-
FBI Director Robert Mueller,37 who, the plaintiffs alleged, crafted and 
directed discriminatory policies leading to the plaintiffs’ mistreat-
ment.38 Ashcroft and Mueller successfully moved to dismiss the 
claims against them in 2005.39
 In 2009, in a decision written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme 
Court held that this dismissal had been proper under Twombly. The 
Iqbal decision confirmed that Twombly was not limited to particular 
types of actions.40 It also elaborated on the implementation of the 
Twombly standard, describing a district court judge’s assessment of 
the plausibility of a claim as “a context-specific task that requires 
the . . . court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”41
And it offered some more structured guidelines for analysis of com-
plaints on motions to dismiss: 
[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by 
identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than 
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While 
legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they 
must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-
pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity 
and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an 
entitlement to relief.42
                                          
 35. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
 36. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 147-49 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 37. Id. at 147. 
38. See, e.g., id. at 175 (“[T]he complaint alleges broadly that Ashcroft and Mueller 
were instrumental in adopting the ‘policies and practices challenged here.’ ”). 
 39. See id. (citing Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 1409, 2005 WL 2375202 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005)). 
 40. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009). 
 41. Id. at 1950. 
 42. Id.
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 While not presented as a mandatory scheme, this two-step frame-
work outlines Justice Kennedy’s approach to analysis of the Iqbal
complaint; the majority opinion first identified certain allegations 
referring to Ashcroft and Mueller as “conclusory” and thus to be dis-
regarded43 before concluding that the remaining allegations did not 
plausibly support the inference that Ashcroft and Mueller acted 
with the required state of mind.44 In this way, the analysis suggest-
ed not only that allegations consisting of “conclusions” may not be 
assumed to be true, but also that they should be treated as if they do 
not appear in the complaint when the court assesses the plausibility 
of the plaintiff’s claim.45 Dissenting, Justice Souter, author of the 
Twombly majority opinion, contended that the plausibility of a claim 
should be assessed based on consideration of the complaint as a 
whole; in his view, the majority’s excision of “conclusory” allegations 
from the complaint robbed its remaining allegations concerning 
Ashcroft and Mueller of significance, and thus misconceived the in-
ferences they supported.46
B.   Should This Have Happened? 
 Twombly and Iqbal have generated a massive volume of commen-
tary.47 Most of the commentary is evaluative, identifying problems 
with the legitimacy or predicted implementation of the decisions or, 
less often, refuting such criticisms. Assuming the decisions do mark a 
significant legal change, some commentary also ventures explana-
tions of the reasons Twombly and Iqbal might have been decided as 
they were. This Section focuses on the evaluative commentary on 
Iqbal; the next discusses efforts to explain the decision. 
                                          
 43. Id. at 1951. For further discussion of this analysis, see Steinman, supra note 19, 
at 1308-10. 
 44. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951-52. 
 45. See also infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text, for a discussion of district 
courts’ citation of Iqbal’s equation of plausibility with reasonable inference. 
 46. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1960-61 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 47. See, e.g., sources discussed supra notes 2-8; see also, e.g., Capital Report, Congress 
Considers Impact of Iqbal and Twombly Rulings, 46 TRIAL, Feb. 2010, at 10, 10 (“In 
December, the full Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing . . . to discuss the impact of 
[Twombly and Iqbal]. . . . At the hearing, Senate Judiciary Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) 
said the Supreme Court had ‘abandoned’ 50 years of precedent to enact ‘judge-made law,’ 
potentially denying justice to thousands of Americans.[Professor] Stephen Burbank . . . 
cautioned that the court’s misguided decision will lead to a ‘whole new brand of mischief’ in 
which trial judges subjectively dismiss complaints.”). 
 An exhaustive discussion of commentary on Iqbal would be voluminous and soon 
obsolete; as of March 6, 2011, Westlaw listed 769 articles citing Iqbal in law reviews and 
professional journals. More than half of these articles appear in professional journals, and 
many address the implications of the case for particular areas of law, such as employment 
discrimination and civil rights, or particular settings, such as bankruptcy proceedings and 
state court systems. The discussion in this Part does provide a comprehensive overview of 
the commentary treating Twombly and Iqbal in general terms as of the date of drafting. 
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 In a recent article assessing responses to Iqbal,48 David Noll noted 
that criticism of the decision tends to draw on arguments of three 
types: (1) a “Catch-22” argument that the decision disadvantages 
those plaintiffs least able to offer more factual detail in their plead-
ings (for example, consumers and victims of civil-rights violations); 
(2) a “judicial discretion” argument that the “plausibility” standard 
cannot be applied consistently and will lead to judicial abuse; and 
(3) an “illegitimacy” argument attacking the propriety of judicial 
revision of the Conley standard, especially in light of the Court’s 
unanimous position in Swierkiewicz.49 As Noll acknowledges, there is 
some overlap among these arguments. The argument that Iqbal 
licenses judicial discretion often accompanies the argument that 
judges will exercise that discretion to serve their personal visions of 
the claims that deserve to be litigated. The argument that the stand-
ard contravenes Rule 8(a)(2) may also be cast as an argument about 
the permissible bounds of judicial discretion. And the argument that 
the decisions are illegitimate sometimes takes the form of an argu-
ment that the “plausibility” standard violates Seventh Amendment 
limitations on trial judges’ decisionmaking.50 But Noll’s breakdown 
accurately captures the general shape of criticism of Twombly and 
Iqbal. Before Iqbal was decided, the first two arguments (about the 
differential disadvantaging of certain plaintiffs and about subjectiv-
ity) appeared to be dominant.51 After Iqbal, the third (the argument 
about illegitimacy) has become equally visible.52
                                          
 48. See David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 GEO. L.J. 117 (2010). 
 49. Id. at 120-21. 
 50. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Klein, Ashcroft v. Iqbal Crashes Rule 8 Pleading Standards 
onto Unconstitutional Shores, 88 NEB. L. REV. 261, 262 (2009) (arguing that Iqbal “is 
unconstitutional when measured against the traditional . . . interpretation of the Seventh 
Amendment”); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to 
Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 38 (2010) (“[T]he 
Iqbal/Twombly standard is unconstitutional.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Saritha Komatireddy Tice, Recent Developments, A “Plausible” 
Explanation of Pleading Standards: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007),
31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 827, 827, 838 (2008) (emphasizing “leeway” given to lower 
courts and lawyers by Twombly and “uncertainty” it created); A. Benjamin Spencer, 
Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 433 (2008) (arguing that Twombly “will 
frustrate the efforts of plaintiffs with valid claims to get into court”). 
 52. For examples of the Catch-22 argument, see Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 291 
(describing Iqbal as “the five conservative justices on the Court making it harder for those 
with claims to get access to the federal judiciary”), Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering 
Access:Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 285 
(2009) (reading decisions as “signal[ing] an attenuation of access as a guiding principle”), 
Lisa Eichhorn, A Sense of Disentitlement: Frame-Shifting and Metaphor in Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 62 FLA. L. REV. 951, 952 (2010) (arguing that decisions “place plaintiffs in a Catch-
22”), and Schneider, supra note 4, at 519 (“[T]he greatest impact of this change . . . is the 
dismissal of civil rights and employment discrimination cases from federal courts.”). 
 For examples of the discretion argument, see Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the 
Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 535 (2009) [hereinafter Burbank, 
General Rules] (describing the standard as “an invitation to the lower courts to make ad 
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 Noll’s taxonomy helps to make the voluminous commentary on 
Iqbal comprehensible. But three other refrains are equally wide-
spread in that commentary. First, many commentators, including 
Noll,53 express agnosticism about the likely impact of Twombly and 
Iqbal.54 They argue that it is too soon to know whether consequence-
                                                                                                
hoc decisions reflecting buried policy choices”), The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—Leading 
Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV. 252, 261 (2009) (“By imposing a probability requirement, the 
Court imposed its own view of the most likely explanation for a set of allegations—
performing a role normally reserved for the factfinder—and invited lower courts to do the 
same.”), Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 291 (“What is plausible and credible to one district 
judge is not going to be plausible and credible to another.”), Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 
3, at 832 (criticizing Iqbal for “fix[ing] on a novel and unpredictable test”), Eichhorn, 
supra, at 953 (noting “the unbounded discretion that the opinion grants to judges”), Kilaru, 
supra note 3, at 919-20 (noting that decisions “give lower courts a tremendous power 
that they did not have before”), Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A 
Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 26 (2010) 
(describing “judicial experience and common sense” as “highly ambiguous and subjective 
concepts”), Rajiv Mohan, Recent Development, A Retreat from Decision by Rule in Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1191, 1196, 1197 (2010) 
(describing Iqbal holding as “highly discretionary”), Pardo, supra note 8, at 1466 (referring 
to “unprincipled discretion” licensed by decisions), Collyn A. Peddie, Let’s All Play Iqbal, 46 
TRIAL, Aug. 2010, at 54, 54 (“[D]efendants and some courts . . . see [in Iqbal] a Darwinian 
panacea that gives judges virtually unfettered discretion.”), and Robert L. Rothman, 
Twombly and Iqbal: A License to Dismiss, 35:3 LITIGATION 1, 2 (2009) (“Iqbal has the 
potential to short-circuit the adversary process by shutting the doors of federal courthouses 
. . . based on what amounts to a district court judge’s effectively irrefutable, subjective 
assessment of probable success.”). 
 For examples of the illegitimacy argument, see Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading 
Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 883-
84 (2010) (arguing that the Supreme Court “is not in a good position to gather and process” 
the information needed to determine the optimal stringency of pleading standards); 
Stephen B. Burbank, Summary Judgment, Pleading, and the Future of Transsubstantive 
Procedure, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1189, 1191-92 (2010) [hereinafter Burbank, Future] (arguing 
that Iqbal “ignored the requirements of the Enabling Act and [the Court’s] own prior 
decisions”); Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 3, at 832 (criticizing the Court’s “follow[ing] a 
disruptive legal process in . . . altering a defining feature of the litigation system”); Mark 
Herrmann, James M. Beck & Stephen B. Burbank, Debate, Plausible Denial: Should 
Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141, 155 (2009), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/PlausibleDenial.pdf  (arguing, in contribution by 
Burbank, that decisions cannot be described as interpretations of Rule 8(a)(2)). 
 53. Noll, supra note 48, at 122, 147, 149 (concluding that “the answer to the question 
‘What do we know about the Iqbal model?’ is ‘Not much’ ” and that Iqbal is likely a 
“watershed opinion[] whose deep logic only gradually becomes clear and whose language 
fails to capture that deep logic”). 
 54. See, e.g., Mark Anderson & Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Expected Cost 
of False Positive Error, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1 (2010) (noting that “real world” 
operation of standard “is poorly understood”); Thomas P. Gressette, Jr., The Heightened 
Pleading Standard of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal: A New Phase 
in American Legal History Begins, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 401, 448 (2010) (noting that 
implications of Iqbal remain unclear); John G. McCarthy, An Early Review of Iqbal in the 
Circuit Courts, 57 FED. LAW, May 2010, at 36, 36-37 (“Opinions issued by many . . . circuit 
courts in which Iqbal is discussed or analyzed arrive at the same result that would have 
been reached under prior case law.”); Colin T. Reardon, Pleading in the Information Age, 85 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 2170, 2181-82 (2010) (suggesting that cases involving “severe 
information[al] asymmetries” may be rarer than many critics contend); Kendall W. 
Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
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focused criticisms of the decisions (the possibilities that they might 
disadvantage certain classes of plaintiffs and be applied unpre-
dictably) are well-founded. In addition, more than a few critical and 
agnostic responses stress not the implications of the decisions in the 
abstract, but decisional techniques that litigants and courts might 
use to cabin any potential adverse effects.55 The position of these 
observers is that Iqbal and Twombly need not make a big difference 
in practice, regardless of their implications in theory. And with ap-
parently increasing frequency, some have been arguing that 
Twombly and Iqbal are defensible in theory as well as in practice, 
either because they represent sound solutions to problems arising 
from changes in civil litigation over the past fifty years56 or because 
                                                                                                
Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1815 (2008) (concluding, based 
on a study of district court decisions in the seven months following Twombly, that it 
“appears to have had almost no substantive impact,” except in civil rights cases, where the 
decisions “show a significant departure” from prior patterns); Michael R. Huston, Note, 
Pleading With Congress to Resist the Urge to Overrule Twombly and Iqbal, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 415, 427 (2010) (arguing that decisions “have not dramatically increased the number 
of cases dismissed in federal court for failure to state a claim”). 
 55. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 52, at 851 (urging consideration of “Twombly’s virtues 
without the taint of Iqbal’s vices”); Stephen B. Brown, Reconstructing Pleading: Twombly, 
Iqbal, and the Limited Role of the Plausibility Inquiry, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1265, 1267 (2010) 
(“[M]uch of this criticism [of the decisions] is unjustified because it overlooks the analytical 
steps that occur before the plausibility inquiry”); Robin J. Effron, The Plaintiff Neutrality 
Principle: Pleading Complex Litigation in the Era of Twombly and Iqbal, 51 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1997, 1998 (2010) (proposing a “plaintiff neutrality principle” for use in 
implementing standard); Hartnett, supra note 8, at 474-75 (emphasizing “Twombly’s 
connection to prior law and suggest[ing] ways in which it can be tamed”); Suzette M. 
Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address 
the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 70 
(2010) (“[T]rial courts . . . should consider narrow, targeted discovery to determine 
plausibility at the pleading stage.”); Seiner, supra note 4, at 181 (offering “an analytical 
framework for asserting the essential facts of a Title VII claim”); A. Benjamin Spencer, 
Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2009) (“[T]he . . . defining 
principle of contemporary pleading doctrine is the requirement that a complaint . . . 
describe events about which there is a presumption of impropriety.”); Allan R. Stein, 
Confining Iqbal, 45 TULSA L. REV. 277, 277 (2009) (urging “a limiting construction [of 
Iqbal] that may serve to constrain its impact beyond its peculiar context”); Steinman, supra
note 19, at 1298, 1314, 1324-25 (“[T]he primary inquiry at the pleadings phase is not a 
claim’s ‘plausibility,’ but rather whether a necessary element of a plaintiff’s claim is alleged 
in the form of a ‘mere legal conclusion.’”). 
 56. See, e.g., Hartnett, supra note 8, at 474-75 (suggesting that a “tamed Twombly” is 
consistent with “broader trends toward managerial and discretionary judging”); Herrmann, 
Beck & Burbank, supra note 52, at 147 (maintaining, in contribution from Herrmann & 
Beck, that “given the enormous transaction costs that litigation entails, Type II errors 
(false negatives[, disadvantaging plaintiffs with weak but meritorious claims]) are probably 
preferable to Type I errors (false positives)”); id. at 157 (arguing that “[t]he discovery 
system is, in fact, broken”) (quoting INTERIM REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMER-
ICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 3 (2008), available at 
http://druganddevicelaw.net/ACTL%20Discovery%20Report.pdf; Kenneth S. Klein, Is
Ashcroft v. Iqbal the Death (Finally) of the “Historical Test” for Interpreting the Seventh 
Amendment?, 88 NEB. L. REV. 467, 468 (2010) (arguing that Iqbal may “be the necessary 
impetus to revisit . . . the way we interpret the Seventh Amendment’s preservation of a 
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they are more faithful to the original vision of Rule 8(a)(2) and Con-
ley than were intervening decisions such as Swierkiewicz.57 This 
perspective casts the decisions as eminently practical and critics as 
unduly formalist. 
 Noll also does not seek to explain—or to describe how others have 
explained—the reasons Twombly and Iqbal might have been decided 
as they were. Such explanations are often implicit in particular criti-
cisms or defenses of the decisions, most of which are based on partic-
ular normative visions of judicial decisionmaking. For example, a 
conclusion that Iqbal is problematic because it disadvantages infor-
mation-poor plaintiffs can fit well with an account of Iqbal as more or 
                                                                                                
right to a jury trial”); Rebecca Love Kourlis, Jordan M. Singer & Natalie Knowlton, 
Reinvigorating Pleadings, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 245, 246 (2010) (“In hindsight . . ., removing 
the issue-narrowing function [of the common-law system] from pleadings has proven to be 
a serious mistake. . . . [A] move to fact-based pleading need not upset the general structure 
and values of the existing pretrial process.”); Ressler, supra note 4, at 632 (contending that 
“Twombly[] . . . offers an excellent solution to the problem of inefficient and costly personal 
jurisdiction determinations”); Schwartz & Appel, supra note 4, at 1110 (concluding that 
broadnotice pleading has “rightfully ‘earned its retirement’” and that state courts should 
follow plausibility standard); Smith, supra note 4, at 1055 (arguing that Iqbal “is likely to 
increase the efficiency and fairness of modern civil practice”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
Refocusing Away from Rules Reform and Devoting More Attention to the Deciders, 87 DENV.
U. L. REV. 335, 340-42 (2010) (arguing that before decisions, district court judges “regularly 
err[ed] in deciding Rule 12 dismissal motions,” often “giv[ing] credence to incredibly weak 
legal arguments and factual assertions”); Jay Tidmarsh, Resolving Cases “On the Merits,”
87 DENV. U. L. REV. 407, 407-08 (2010) (noting “deep flaws” of the pre-Twombly regime). 
 57. See, e.g., Andrew Blair-Stanek, Twombly Is the Logical Extension of the Mathews 
v. Eldridge Test to Discovery, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2010) (arguing that the Twombly 
decision was “not revolutionary, but simply part of the Court’s ever-expanding application 
of the familiar three-factor Mathews v. Eldridge test”); Scott Dodson, Comparative 
Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 441, 455 (2010) (“America may be 
moving toward the global norm by experimenting with more rigorous fact pleading and 
dispensing with mere notice pleading.”); Herrmann, Beck & Burbank, supra note 52, at 146 
(arguing, in contribution from Herrmann & Beck, that decisions “are right on the law,” 
since “the better-reasoned decisions did not credit [“labels,” “conclusions,” and “formulaic 
recitations”] even under Conley”); Hillel Y. Levin, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Lessons of the
Celotex Trilogy, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 143, 144 (2010) (arguing that both sets of 
decisions “are best viewed as lag indicators (albeit imperfect ones) of what had been going 
on in the lower courts for years”); Darrell A.H. Miller, Iqbal and Empathy, 78 UMKC L.
REV. 999, 1005 (2010) (“Iqbal . . . lays bare both the fact that pleading doctrine is a form of 
‘choice architecture’ and that the materials used to build that architecture [legal doctrine 
and language] are seriously, and ineluctably, deficient.”); Pardo, supra note 8, at 1485 
(concluding that decisions are consistent with proposed “unified theory of civil litigation,” 
implicit in prior doctrine and practice); Pocker, supra note 4, at 38 (“[I]t is hard to see how 
the analysis now required is any more subjective or capable of prolonging dubious litigation 
than was the Conley v. Gibson process.”); Smith, supra note 4, at 1055 (arguing that Iqbal
is “consistent with the text of Rule 8, giving effect to the language that in the past had 
often lain dormant”); Spencer, supra note 55, at 5 (“[B]y bringing fact pleading out of the 
shadows . . ., the Supreme Court has made it possible . . . to discuss pleading doctrine 
without having to contend with the pesky contradictions between . . . high-minded rhetoric 
about notice pleading and the reality on the ground of particularized pleading.”); Adam 
McDonnell Moline, Comment, Nineteenth-Century-Principles for Twenty-First-Century 
Pleading, 60 EMORY L.J. 159, 163 (2010) (arguing that decisions “mark a return to the 
original meaning of the Rules”). 
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less consciously intended to disadvantage exactly those plaintiffs. 
Articulating a similar point before Iqbal was decided, Lonny Hoffman 
has suggested that commentators’ ideological commitments to par-
ticular visions of procedural reform drive their descriptions of the 
significance of pleading doctrine.58 But as the next Section suggests, 
this explanation of commentators’ disagreements is not completely 
satisfying, given that commentators themselves tend to explain the 
emergence of the new pleading standards in an analogous way.  
C.   Why Did This Happen? 
 Why did the Court decide Iqbal as it did? As this Section will detail, 
most of the explanations advanced to date rest on a legal realist-
influenced assumption that the decision was to some extent pre-
textual. Some focus on the extraordinary nature of the dispute at 
issue in the case. Most, however, explain Iqbal as a stealth reform of 
the civil litigation system, intended to achieve systemic goals not dis-
cussed in the decision itself. 
 More than a few observers have suggested that the sensational 
facts in Iqbal’s case might have swamped the Justices’ consideration 
of the broader implications of their decision. On this account, the ma-
jority Justices were blinded to the technical implications of the case 
by their biases against Javaid Iqbal, a noncitizen, and in favor of 
Ashcroft and Mueller, as well as by a reluctance to second-guess 
high-level executive national security decisions.59 While the hot-
                                          
 58. Hoffman described a basic ideological split among commentators on pleading 
reform that remains valid after Iqbal. Some commentators are “Traditionalists,” holding 
“that robust efforts to regulate [litigation] at the pleading stage are wrongheaded and 
inconsistent with the traditional pleading standard” expressed in Conley; others are 
“Reformists,” who “favor . . . an expanded judicial role” in regulating civil litigation and 
whose approach appears to be reflected in Twombly. Hoffman, supra note 8, at 1225. See 
also Robert D. Owen & Travis Mock, The Plausibility of Pleadings After Twombly and
Iqbal, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 181, 181 (2010) (noting emphasis of commentary on “broad 
range of theories and narratives, which often appear to be shaped by the authors’ pre-
existing beliefs about the proper role of pleadings in federal civil litigation”). 
 Noll does not explore in depth the reasons for the Iqbal decision. See, e.g., Noll, supra
note 48, at 132 (arguing that the “open texture” of Iqbal is “the product of a number of 
factors, some . . . inherent in the project of laying down general standards, . . . others . . . 
linked to how the Court reintroduced factual screening into federal practice”). 
 59. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Iqbal and Bad Apples, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 217, 
218-19 (2010) (focusing on how Iqbal “puts the imprimatur of the Supreme Court on a 
particular narrative of the excesses carried out by the Bush Administration in the name of 
fighting terrorism”); Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT.
REV. 225, 227 (2009) (“Iqbal illustrates one side of the relationship between national 
security case law and the larger domain of public law: Emergencies are opportunities for 
sweeping doctrinal and functional changes affecting many subject matters.”); Sidhu, supra
note 4, at 423 (arguing that Iqbal “may be one of the most infamous and harmful [opinions] 
to American jurisprudence and individual rights of this generation”); Stein, supra note 55, 
at 277 (arguing that Iqbal “lends itself to a much narrower construction,” based on “[t]he 
substantive law controlling the defendants’ immunity”). 
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button nature of the dispute surely had some relation to the Court’s 
decision to review it and to the Justices’ attitudes toward Iqbal’s 
complaint, this explanation seems too simple, since it requires us to 
assume that these aspects of the case entirely overcame the Justices’ 
ordinary conceptions of their roles. 
 Others explain the decision as a pretext not for the exercise of 
animus against noncitizens or solicitude for executive-branch offi-
cials, but for sweeping reform of the civil litigation system. Some 
commentary thus explains the Twombly and Iqbal decisions as moti-
vated by a desire to deter suits by “outsider” parties presumed more 
likely to initiate harassing litigation, be they consumers (as in 
Twombly), aliens (as in Iqbal), or putative victims of civil-rights 
violations (as in Iqbal and Swierkiewicz). This explanation also as-
sumes that the Justices’ biases drive their legal reasoning, but it 
views that bias as one favoring “insider” parties like government 
entities, large corporations, and defendants in general, while disfa-
voring “outsider” parties. It often accompanies critiques of Iqbal on 
grounds of illegitimacy and the creation of a Catch-22 for plaintiffs.60
Other commentary explains the decisions not as driven by animus 
per se but as efforts to disguise broad procedural reform—aimed 
especially at reducing the costs of civil discovery—as a modest read-
justment of pleading standards.61 This argument, however, is in some 
                                          
 60. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court 
Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 875-77 (2009) (describing Twombly as focused on “prevent[ing] 
undesirable lawsuits from entering the court system”); Scott Dodson, Essay, Pleading 
Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. (IN BRIEF) 135, 138 (2007) 
(suggesting that Twombly was motivated by goal of “[s]afeguarding defendants from 
meritless strike suits”); Helen Gunnarsson, Iqbal: A “Dangerous” Tightening of Federal 
Pleading Standards?, 97 ILL. B.J. 602, 602 (2009) (“Professor Stephen B. Burbank . . . was 
quoted in The New York Times as saying Iqbal is ‘a blank check for federal judges to get 
rid of cases they disfavor.’ ”); Jois, supra note 3, at 901 (describing Iqbal as exemplifying 
“the invention of procedural rules to significantly curtail the availability of remedies in 
civil litigation”); Marcus, supra note 4, at 412 (suggesting that decisions “bespeak hostility 
to the underlying substantive claims”); Miller, supra note 52, at 53 (describing decisions as 
“motivated in significant part by a desire to develop a stronger role for motions to dismiss 
to filter out a hypothesized excess of meritless litigation, to deter allegedly abusive 
practices, and to contain costs”); Schneider, supra note 4, at 518 (arguing that decisions are 
attributable in part to “widespread and generalized ‘hostility to litigation’ ” at every level of 
the federal judiciary); A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive 
Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 197 (2010) (“[T]he Iqbal majority’s new fact 
skepticism . . . derives from, and gives voice to, what appears to be the institutional biases 
of the Justices, as elite insiders.”); Steinman, supra note 19, at 1299 (noting that decisions 
“appear to be result-oriented decisions designed to terminate . . . lawsuits that struck the 
majorities as undesirable”); Tice, supra note 51, at 827 (noting that Twombly “signals a 
growing hostility toward litigation”); Bravin, supra note 2, at A8 (quoting Richard Samp of 
the Washington Legal Foundation as stating that the Court decided Iqbal as it did because 
it “is sort of fed up with excesses in the tort system and is looking for ways to try to 
eliminate frivolous lawsuits”). 
 61. See, e.g., Blair-Stanek, supra note 57, at 1 (arguing that Twombly was “part of the 
Court’s ever-expanding application of the familiar three-factor Mathews v. Eldridge  test” 
to discovery costs); Miller, supra note 52, at 53 (describing decisions as “motivated . . . by a 
2012]  IQBAL AND INTERPRETATION 433
tension with criticism of the Twombly/Iqbal standard as licensing 
boundless discretion, since the Justices have no way to ensure that 
district court judges will share their visions of the appropriate direction 
of reform.62 Overall, the realist vision of the decisions as pretextual 
attributes to judges ignorance of the very phenomenon that is so ob-
vious to commentators; although there is surely some truth in such 
explanations, they are less than fully satisfying. Even some of the 
explanations acknowledging that Iqbal and Twombly must have 
stemmed from more complex motivations attribute the details of the 
standard to a regrettable judicial habit of clothing motivations in 
neutral doctrinal garb63 or to hubris resulting from the Justices’ in-
experience with trial court-level decisionmaking.64
 A few explanations decline to take this realist approach. They cast 
Twombly and Iqbal as relatively straightforward responses to changes 
in federal civil litigation.65 The rest of this Article considers a distinct 
                                                                                                
desire to develop a stronger role for motions to dismiss to . . . contain costs”); Reardon, 
supra note 54, at 2178 (noting that “[p]lausibility pleading” “arose out of” concerns with 
discovery costs); Lee H. Rosenthal, From Rules of Procedure to How Lawyers Litigate: 
‘Twixt the Cup and the Lip, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 227, 227 (2010) (noting that decisions were 
driven “in part[ by] a concern that discovery is so expensive and burdensome that 
pleadings must be found sufficient before discovery is allowed to begin”); Smith, supra note 
4, at 1055 (arguing that Iqbal marks a “recogni[tion] that, as the costs of litigation increase 
and the scope of discovery expands, the need for more stringent pleading standards 
increases”); Subrin, supra note 4, at 390 (characterizing standards as motivated partly by 
“[t]he expense of discovery in federal court”). 
 62. Cf. McCarthy, supra note 54, at 37 (“After eight months . . ., it appears that[] in 
most circuits the Iqbal decision will not change the result reached in most cases.”). 
 63. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 51, at 468 (“Perhaps by ridiculing the statement in 
Conley as some crazy old relative that had long been viewed derisively by most members of 
the family, the Court was able to conceal the magnitude of what it was doing . . . and to get 
away with not making any effort to articulate the compelling justification ordinarily 
required for departures from stare decisis.”); see also Edward Brunet, The Substantive 
Origins of “Plausible Pleadings”, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 14 (2010) (arguing that 
Court’s use of “plausible” term was “misguided and only continues to confuse what is 
already a less than clear standard”); Burbank, General Rules, supra note 52, at 535 
(arguing that the Supreme Court should “forthrightly require fact pleading as a matter of 
substantive federal common law”); Eichhorn, supra note 52, at 953 (“[B]y drawing on a 
metaphor of judging-as-measuring, the Court invests its new plausibility test with the 
appearance of objective consistency, and in so doing, deflects attention from the unbounded 
discretion that the opinion grants to judges who will administer that test from now on in 
the lower courts.”).  
 64. See, e.g., Edward D. Cavanaugh, Twombly, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and the Courts, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 877, 882-89 (2008) (arguing that Twombly showed 
Court to be “out of touch with the judicial system that it is charged with managing”); 
Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 3, at 850 (arguing that the “opinions . . . smack more of 
confusion than of political motivation”); Miller, supra note 57, at 1006 (arguing that Iqbal
“seems largely uninformed by psychological evidence detailing the way in which human 
beings—including judges—assess likelihoods”); Reinert, supra note 4, at 946 (arguing that 
Iqbal evinced “the Court’s profound mistrust of lower courts’ ability to use their case 
management power to balance concerns like qualified immunity and abusive discovery,” 
thus representing “a shift in power within the judiciary”).  
 65. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 57, at 144 (arguing that decisions “are best viewed as 
lag indicators (albeit imperfect ones) of what had been going on in the lower courts for 
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and novel explanation for the decisions, one that also declines to 
attribute to the Justices motivations that are not apparent from the 
Iqbal opinions themselves. The Justices deciding Iqbal, when faced 
with the question of the significance to be attached to the allegations 
in Iqbal’s complaint, honestly struggled with that question and cast 
their answers in terms indicating that they saw their struggles as 
involving interpretation of the complaint as a text. The Justices’ dif-
fering conclusions were, to be sure, colored by their presuppositions 
about human behavior both in and outside the civil litigation system, 
but those conclusions were also colored by the Justices’ divergent 
understandings of the practice of textual interpretation. The Justices 
did not clearly describe the problem in these terms, however. They 
did not do so for the same reason that commentators, even when rec-
ognizing that the decision involved and licensed a kind of textual 
interpretation, have been reluctant to pursue the implications of this 
observation. The Justices and commentators alike have grown up 
within, and had their vocabularies shaped by, a procedural vision 
that represses the role that textual interpretation plays in the early 
stages of civil litigation. 
III.   PRAGMATISM AND INTERPRETATION IN PROCEDURAL DOCTRINE
 The view of Twombly and Iqbal advanced here is in some respects 
counterintuitive. Accepting it requires a critical perspective on a 
powerful legal-historical narrative that most academic commentators 
and many judges embrace and endorse: what this Article calls the 
standard story of pleading. The origins of this narrative lie in the 
adoption of a particular philosophical and social vision—the pragmatic 
vision—by those responsible for shaping the federal civil legal system 
in the United States during the first several decades of the twentieth 
century. When this vision was taken up by lawyers and particularly 
by proceduralists, important aspects of its originator’s thought had 
already been repressed—specifically, a concern with the analysis of 
meaning (including, but not limited to, the special case of verbal 
meaning). Because today’s neo-pragmatism and legal pragmatism 
descend from this simplified pragmatic vision, they too look very little 
like pragmatism in its earliest form. That richer pragmatic vision 
holds much of value, as is shown by subsequent work drawing on it in 
other legal areas. In particular, it supports a thicker, more accurate 
description of many of our common experiences, including our experi-
ences with legal communication and norm development. As this Part 
shows, Iqbal is a natural, if not exactly predictable, result of all of 
these developments. Many judges have long implicitly recognized the 
                                                                                                
years”); Moline, supra note 57, at 163 (arguing that decisions “mark a return to the original 
meaning of the Rules”). 
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role of interpretation in screening pleadings, but neither judges, liti-
gants, nor commentators have had access to a vocabulary for express-
ing that recognition. This conceptual impoverishment breeds unnec-
essary discomfort with the notion that judges’ activity with respect to 
complaints might most accurately be conceived as interpretive.    
A.   The Return of Pragmatism’s Repressed 
 Fleshing out the sketch offered in the previous paragraph, this 
Section considers, first, the standard story of pleading that is now so 
widely accepted as legally authoritative, then the simplification of 
pragmatism that occurred around the time this story was formulated 
and that shaped later understandings of procedure and legal inter-
pretation, and finally the ways this simplification has affected the 
doctrine and commentary discussed in Part I.   
 1.   The Standard Story of Pleading 
 A chief architect of the standard story of pleading was Judge 
Charles E. Clark, who was the drafter of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and, as such, was responsible for the account of prior 
pleading regimes presupposed by the pleading portion of those 
Rules.66 In his writing on this topic, Clark split the history of plead-
ing practices into three phases, progressing from common-law or “is-
sue” pleading through nineteenth-century code or “fact” pleading and 
culminating in the more practical “notice” pleading that Clark cham-
pioned in the early twentieth century. In Clark’s description, the 
progression through these phases involved a gradually decreasing 
“emphasis . . . [on] the pleading stage of the trial,” in accordance with 
what Clark presented as a natural tendency of maturing legal sys-
tems.67 It is only a slight overstatement to say that this story has 
been universally accepted by subsequent proceduralists.68
 Clark was critical of the first chapter in his story, that of common-
law pleading. In early modern England, where this regime developed, 
                                          
 66. On Clark’s contribution to the drafting of the Federal Rules, see especially David 
Marcus, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Legal Realism as a Jurisprudence of 
Law Reform, 44 GA. L. REV. 433, 448-501 (2010); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity 
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 961-73 (1987). Marcus provides a comprehensive bibliography of 
Clark’s writings on civil procedure, including pleading topics (on which Clark wrote a great 
deal), at Marcus, supra, at 435 n.1, and concludes that Clark would have found Iqbal “an 
anathema,” id. at 507. This Article agrees but provides a slightly different explanation of 
why. Its account of Clark’s narrative draws heavily on CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF 
THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING (2d ed. 1947). 
 67. CLARK, supra note 66, at 12 (noting a parallel between tendency in Roman law 
to reduce emphasis on pleadings over time and similar tendency in Anglo-American 
legal systems). 
 68. See infra Part III.A.3, especially notes 133-37 and accompanying text. 
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a plaintiff hoping to initiate a civil action had to “procure[] a writ” 
from the chancery clerks; the writs available were limited to a specific, 
fixed set of “forms of action” that grew only slowly and haphazardly 
to accommodate new kinds of disputes.69 Once a writ had been ob-
tained, the issues for decision by the court were identified through a 
back-and-forth exchange of further pleading documents that placed a 
premium on esoteric drafting skills.70 The fatal flaws of common-law 
pleading, according to Clark, were its extreme formalism and the 
substantive injustices this formalism engendered.71 In Clark’s account, 
the formal meaninglessness of common-law pleadings was the flip-
side of their functional excess of significance for the litigation process 
(although Clark did not cast his critique of the process explicitly in 
terms of “meaning”). 
 Clark was less dismissive of code or fact pleading, the second 
chapter in his story. The mid-nineteenth-century New York civil 
procedure code that supplied the prototype for this regime72 absorbed 
the more free-form regime of equity pleading favored by Clark73 and 
replaced claim-specific pleading requirements with the general re-
quirement that every civil complaint contain just a statement of the 
facts constituting the cause of action.74 But as courts began to use 
this statutory language to explain their conclusions about the suffi-
ciency of particular pleadings, the standard’s apparent simplicity 
broke down. Trial court judges reached different conclusions about 
whether identical allegations were “statements of fact,” as required 
                                          
 69. CLARK, supra note 66, at 14-15. 
 70. Thus, Clark wrote,  
the common-law system was limited in the extent of the relief which it could 
grant and the manner of granting it to the arbitrary units comprising the forms 
of action. Coupled with this were the refinements enforced to induce the 
production of an issue [for trial], resulting in a highly technical system which 
afforded none too complete relief.  
Id. at 15. 
 71. Echoes of Clark’s assessment of common-law pleading as formalist appear 
throughout recent commentary. See, e.g., Jason G. Gottesman, Comment, Speculating as to 
the Plausible: Pleading Practice After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 17 WIDENER L.J. 973, 
976 (2008) (“Pleading in [the common-law] system was full of dangerous pitfalls for 
careless lawyers. The formalistic and repetitious requirements created a situation where 
the slightest error in pleading would cause the dismissal of the action.”); Hannon, supra
note 54, at 1812 (explaining that “[a]t its early common law stage, pleading in the United 
States was formalistic to the point of ‘subordinat[ing] substance to form’”). 
 72. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 66, at 23-31; see also Gunther A. Weiss, The 
Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law World, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 435, 506 
(2000) (explaining that by 1897, thirty-one states had enacted civil procedure codes 
modeled on the New York code). 
 73. CLARK, supra note 66, at 16-17, 32-33. 
 74. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein & Daniel H. Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform: 
Drafting Pleading Rules, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 518, 520 (1957) (“[The] New York Code of 
1848 sought only simple truthful statements of the facts showing that there was a cause 
of action.”). 
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by the code standard, or “evidentiary facts” or “conclusions of law,” 
which some courts prohibited.75 Courts also reached different conclu-
sions about the nature of a “cause of action,” and this was the aspect 
of the debate that most engaged Clark.76 His relative lack of interest 
in the “statement of facts” debate is revealing, since that debate, as 
conducted by academic commentators of the era, directly concerned 
verbal meaning and interpretation.77 One side of the “statement of 
facts” controversy urged that the difference between facts and legal 
conclusions was purely conventional, a matter of judicial habits of 
classifying more general allegations as legal and more particular 
ones as factual,78 based on judges’ exposure to prior similar classifica-
tions.79 The other side of the debate insisted on an essential “logical” 
distinction between factual allegations and legal contentions, the latter 
containing technical legal language, the former only everyday or 
“common language.”80 Both sides agreed, however, that understand-
ing pleading requirements required understanding the mechanics of 
verbal communication and comprehension.81 For both sides, analyz-
ing the sufficiency of pleadings required a self-conscious focus on the 
language used in the allegations in a complaint.82
 As mentioned above, Clark mostly steered clear of this debate.83
Preferring to focus on problems with the concept of a “cause of action,” 
                                          
 75. In particular, see Walter Wheeler Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the 
Codes, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 416, 417 (1921) [hereinafter Cook, 1921], and Walter Wheeler 
Cook, ‘Facts’ and ‘Statements of Fact,’ 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 233, 233-35 (1936) [hereinafter 
Cook, 1936]. 
 76. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 66, at 129-38.  
 77. The “statement of facts” debate was conducted mainly between Walter Wheeler 
Cook, a colleague of Clark’s at Yale, and Bernard Gavit, then dean of the Indiana 
University School of Law, who also participated in the “cause of action” debate. See 
especially Cook, 1936, supra note 75; Bernard C. Gavit, Legal Conclusions, 16 MINN. L.
REV. 378 (1932). 
 78. Cook, 1921, supra note 75, at 417 (arguing that there is “no logical distinction” 
between statements of fact and conclusions of law). 
 79. See id. at 420-21; Cook, 1936, supra note 75, at 243-45. 
 80. Gavit, supra note 77, at 389, 391. 
 81. Cook developed this theme in greater detail than Gavit did. The articulation of a 
claim in a complaint, he argued, occurred at the end of a process of abstraction from the 
world of physical stimuli, involving a matching between simplified sense experiences and a 
set of linguistic schemata based on the perceiver’s experiences, education, and purposes. 
Cook, 1936, supra note 75, at 238-40. A similar process occurred, according to Cook, when a 
judge deemed allegations factual or legal. See id.
 82. Id. at 236 (insisting that that issues of pleading are linked to issues of the 
“meaning of words and how words get their meaning”); Gavit, supra note 77, at 378-87 
(discussing ambiguity between common and legal meaning of terms and relationship of 
legal form, or vocabulary, to legal substance, or meaning).  
 83. To be sure, Clark endorsed Cook’s position. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, Walter 
Wheeler Cook, 38 ILL. L. REV. 341, 343 (1944) (describing Cook’s statement-of-fact articles 
as “outstanding”). But in complimenting Cook, Clark also expressed his impatience with 
the debate itself, which he considered “trite” and full of “pseudo learning” (albeit not in 
Cook’s analysis). Id. It is not entirely clear that Clark cared to grapple with the details of 
Cook’s position in this debate. See also infra note 84. Thanks to David Marcus for bringing 
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Clark urged courts, litigants, and commentators not to focus on the 
abstract essence of such causes of action—as common-law pleading had 
done with the analogous forms of action—but to focus on the function
of pleading in general as a vehicle for furthering “trial convenience”84:
This . . . is avowedly a flexible and loose definition of the term 
[“cause of action”]. No ready yardstick is offered a court; but, 
except where aided by previous precedents, it is forced to use its 
discretion, having in mind the purposes to be subserved. This is 
frankly placing the matter in the hands of the judge and seems 
much preferable to the seeming exactness of many definitions 
which turns out to be mere delusion. It seems better to compel a 
court to support its decision on procedural points by arguments 
based on practical trial conditions than upon arbitrary formal 
distinctions read haphazardly into vague phrases.85
The last sentence of this passage makes especially clear how Clark’s 
critique of fact pleading, unlike the “statement of facts” debate, 
deemphasized attention to details of communicative form. In general, 
Clark seemed frustrated by debates over textual meaning, preferring 
to think of the judge’s task at the pleading stage as a matter of dis-
cretionary consideration of the “facts” asserted by the plaintiff (the 
express or implied referents of the plaintiff’s allegations), not of the 
plaintiff’s specific verbal presentation of those facts (the language in 
the complaint).86
 This distaste for thinking of pleadings as texts deeply affected 
subsequent accounts of pleading. It is evident, for example, in the 
Federal Rules’ approach to pleading. The Rules represented Clark’s 
solution to the problems of the code pleading regime and marked the 
beginning of the third chapter in his story: the notice pleading era. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, governing pleadings, contains no 
reference to “statements of facts” and thus made irrelevant debates 
over the nature of complaint language of the kinds summarized 
above. Conley also reflected Clark’s vision of the function of com-
plaints and the trial judge’s role in reviewing them: under Conley, at 
least in theory, plaintiffs did not need to worry about whether their 
allegations were factual, evidentiary, or legal, nor about whether 
they identified legally recognized rights in their pleadings.87 The 
                                                                                                
this article to my attention. 
 84. CLARK, supra note 66, at 137; see also Clark, supra note 83, at 343 (“[T]he modern 
highly successful trend to simplified pleading is built upon Cook’s demonstration that these 
abstractions [statements of fact and law] were not absolutes, only at most differences of 
degree, which should turn not on formalistic rules, but on the need or convenience of the 
business in hand, and the amount of persuasive pressure the pleader desires presently to 
apply.”); Bernard Gavit, A “Pragmatic Definition” of the “Cause of Action”?, 82 U. PA. L.
REV. 129 (1933) (criticizing position taken by Clark and others on this point). 
 85. CLARK, supra note 66, at 138. 
 86. See, e.g., id. at 129; see also supra note 84. 
 87. See supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Steinman, supra note 
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Conley standard appeared to reassign the basis for judicial decision 
regarding the sufficiency of pleadings from characteristics of the 
pleadings as documents to the judge’s assessment of the type of pro-
ceeding likely to follow.88 In later work, Clark explicitly endorsed the 
standard articulated by the Court in Conley.89
 Well before Twombly (and before Swierkiewicz), commentators 
recognized that not all federal courts were actually treating com-
plaints in this way.90 In some kinds of cases (as in Swierkiewicz, at 
the lower court levels), some courts required plaintiffs to plead in 
specific ways in order to survive motions to dismiss.91 But the com-
mentary critical of these practices did not recommend a return to 
understanding pleadings as texts in need of structured explication.92
The prevailing position remained the Clark-Conley assumption that 
the complaint as a text should function as a transparent window into 
more important features of the dispute: that judges should look 
through the paper complaint to the events alleged in it, the defend-
ant’s imputed awareness, and the kind of trial proceedings implied by 
these facts, and that judges should base decisions about pleading suf-
ficiency on conclusions about such underlying or projected facts, not 
on features of the pleading documents. 
 The skeptical commentators were correct that the Clark-Conley 
conception of notice pleading was never an accurate account of what 
litigants and courts were actually doing with complaints. But this 
was not merely because judges treated complaints differently de-
pending on the substantive law involved, the judges’ preconceptions, 
and the inconsistent signals sent by other sources of legal authority, 
as the commentators stressed. It was also because, even in simple, 
everyday cases, judges (and parties arguing motions to dismiss) did 
indeed have to analyze the text of complaints; judges always had to 
try to identify the claims presented by plaintiffs in their complaints 
and to assess whether the complaints included verbal formulations 
directly or indirectly relating to the required components of the iden-
tified claims.93 All along, courts were interpreting complaints as well 
                                                                                                
19, at 1300 (referring to “the liberal approach [to pleading] that governed during the first 
several decades of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”). 
 88. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 66, at 481-95. 
 89. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the “Big Case”?, 21 F.R.D. 45 
(1957), reprinted in PROCEDURE—THE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS OF JUDGE CHARLES 
E. CLARK 147 (Charles Alan Wright & Harry M. Reasoner eds., 1965). 
 90. See generally sources cited supra note 20. 
 91. See, e.g., supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. 
 92. See, e.g., Fairman, supra note 20, at 1059 (attributing irregular adherence to 
Conley to doctrinal confusion and inconsistent messages from Supreme Court); Hazard, 
supra note 20, at 1672 (suggesting that more detailed pleading is appealing to litigants for 
practical reasons); Marcus, supra note 20, at 1750-52 (similar). 
 93. Some deny that this kind of analysis occurs. See, e.g., Fairman, supra note 20, at 
1001; Sherwin, supra note 10, at 75, 84, 94. But most acknowledge that something like it is 
440 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:417 
as the law, even though Clark had strongly suggested that this was 
unnecessary and counterproductive. The variability of practice under 
Conley was a product of this more basic fact as much as it was a 
result of headstrong judges’ decisions to single out certain cases for 
special treatment. 
 Yet Clark’s account of the ideal function of pleadings retains a 
strong hold on contemporary understanding of the issue. Clark’s 
three-part history remains the standard framework for the history of 
pleading in all American civil procedure casebooks and virtually all 
law review articles on procedure.94 This history is explicitly teleologi-
cal. It presents the passage from code to notice pleading as an un-
qualified improvement, and a key aspect of that improvement is the 
renunciation of any concern with the form of pleadings. Clark himself 
identified as “pragmatic[]”95 this focus on pleading as “a means to an 
end,” rather than “an end in itself.”96 The next Section explores why 
he might have chosen this label for his conception of pleading and 
how this choice is related to his insistence that the form of com-
plaints is irrelevant to their sufficiency. 
2.   The Simplification of Pragmatism 
 Clark’s distaste for questions of verbal meaning was not just a 
personal quirk. It was part and parcel of his self-identification as 
“pragmatic.” Specifically, it was a corollary of the way in which philo-
sophical pragmatism was popularized in the first few decades of the 
twentieth century, as pragmatism became not just a school of philo-
sophical thought but a cultural phenomenon.97 One result of this 
development is that it is relatively uncontroversial to claim that most 
American legal professionals and academics are now pragmatists in 
                                                                                                
inevitable. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 60, at 882 (noting that even most liberal pleading 
standard requires a complaint to “offer some reason to believe that the story it tells is 
linked to the elements of a legal claim”); Charles B. Campbell, A “Plausible” Showing After
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 9 NEV. L.J. 1, 22-28 (2008); Huffman, supra note 34, at 
636-37, 639, 652; Ides, supra note 32, at 606-07, 610. 
 94. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: MATERIALS FOR A BASIC 
COURSE 1057-64, 1097-1141 (9th ed. 2007); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., PLEADING
AND PROCEDURE: STATE AND FEDERAL CASES AND MATERIALS 546-647 (9th ed. 2005); 
A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 403-506 (2d 
ed. 2007); STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 333-73 (7th ed. 2008); see also, e.g.,
Schwartz & Appel, supra note 4, at 1108-21; Ellen E. Sward, A History of the Civil 
Trial in the United States, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 347 (2003); infra notes 133-37 and 
accompanying text. 
 95. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 66, at 137 (“The extent of the cause is to be 
determined pragmatically by the court. . . .”); see also Thurman W. Arnold, The Code 
“Cause of Action” Clarified by United States Supreme Court, 19 A.B.A. J. 215 (1933); Gavit, 
supra note 84, at 129; Marcus, supra note 66, at 486. 
 96. CLARK, supra note 66, at 54. 
 97. See, e.g., David A. Hollinger, The Problem of Pragmatism in American History, 67 
J. AM. HIST. 88, 89-91 (1980). 
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some sense.98 Moreover, our form of pragmatism is similar to Clark’s, 
or at least more similar to his form of pragmatism than to what gave 
rise to it. These partly independent developments reinforce the appeal 
of Clark’s account of pleading, making it doubly difficult for us to see 
how Iqbal represents a kind of return of what pragmatism repressed 
as it was popularized. 
 Standard accounts of philosophical pragmatism trace its origins to 
the late nineteenth-century meetings of the Metaphysical Club, 
which counted the future Justice Holmes, as well as Charles S. Peirce 
(1839-1914) and William James (1842-1910) among its members.99
Although Peirce was the oldest of the classic pragmatists, and the 
coinage of the term “pragmatism” is attributed to him,100 his ideas are 
probably the most unfamiliar to contemporary lawyers.101 James and 
John Dewey (1859-1952) more directly sought to shape pre- and inter-
war American political and intellectual culture, as well as legal 
thought, and succeeded in doing so.102 It is not inaccurate to think of 
James and Dewey as developing a coherent tradition begun by 
Peirce, but each of these three thinkers had a different focus. Peirce, 
                                          
 98. See, e.g., Justin Desautels-Stein, At War with the Eclectics: Mapping Pragmatism 
in Contemporary Legal Analysis, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 565, 569-72 (2007); Peter F. Lake, 
Posner’s Pragmatist Jurisprudence, 73 NEB. L. REV. 545, 546, 643-44 (1994); Robert S. 
Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought—A 
Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About Law and Its Use, 66 
CORNELL L. REV. 861, 862, 873, 946-48 (1981). 
 99. See, e.g., LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF IDEAS IN AMERICA
201 (2001). 
 100. See William James, Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results (1898), in 
COLLECTED ESSAYS AND REVIEWS 406, 410 (1920); see also, e.g., Morris Dickstein, 
Pragmatism Then and Now, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL
THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE 1, 1 (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998). 
 101. See, e.g., Hollinger, supra note 97, at 95 (describing Peirce as “the Melville of 
American philosophy”). Although Peirce’s influence on legal thought has been indirect, 
many of his ideas have been adopted in various areas of law. See, e.g., ROBERTA KEVELSON,
THE LAW AS A SYSTEM OF SIGNS (1988) (using Peirce’s semiotic theory to analyze legal 
systems); Susan Haack, On Legal Pragmatism: Where Does “The Path of the Law” Lead 
Us?, 50 AM. J. JURIS. 71, 79-80, 88 (2005); John R. Josephson, On the Proof Dynamics of 
Inference to the Best Explanation, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621 (2001); Note, Holmes, Peirce, 
and Legal Pragmatism, 84 YALE L.J. 1123, 1140 (1975) (concluding that Peirce’s direct 
influence on Holmes may have been greater than Holmes admitted). Most recently, Kevin 
Collins has urged that Peirce’s tripartite semiotic theory supplies the concepts needed to 
make sense of the printed matter doctrine in patent law. See Kevin Emerson Collins, 
Semiotics 101:Taking the Printed Matter Doctrine Seriously, 85 IND. L.J. 1379 (2010). 
 102. See, e.g., DAVID L. HILDEBRAND, BEYOND REALISM AND ANTIREALISM: JOHN DEWEY 
AND THE NEOPRAGMATISTS, at ix (2003) (focusing on Dewey as representative of classical 
pragmatism); JOSEPH MARGOLIS, REINVENTING PRAGMATISM: AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY AT 
THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, at x, 1 (2002) (noting centrality of Dewey to 
neopragmatism); JOHN P. MURPHY, PRAGMATISM: FROM PEIRCE TO DAVIDSON 39 (Richard 
Rorty ed., 1990) (noting that it was James’s 1907 book Pragmatism that “spread 
pragmatism around the world”); RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (ESSAYS 
1972-1980) 28-29, 46, 63-64 (1982); Robert B. Westbrook, Pragmatism and Democracy: 
Reconstructing the Logic of John Dewey’s Faith, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM, supra
note 100, at 128 (noting Dewey’s influence); Dickstein, supra note 100, at 1. 
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who worked as a scientist, focused on logic and what he called his 
“phaneroscopy,” a vast systematic theory of experience and existence 
similar to what would later be called phenomenology.103 James’s 
frame of reference, in contrast, was mostly psychological; Dewey’s 
was social.104 As James and Dewey adapted Peirce’s ideas to their 
own preoccupations for delivery to the wider public, the younger 
pragmatists also abandoned important aspects of the conceptual 
framework within which Peirce had developed those ideas, particu-
larly his interest in the phenomenon of signification, or meaning. 
 A good example of this transformation of Peirce’s ideas is the fate 
of his “pragmatic maxim,” which Peirce first proposed in an 1878 es-
say in these terms:  
[T]he rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of apprehen-
sion [of a conception] is as follows: Consider what effects, that 
might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object 
of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is 
the whole of our conception of the object.105
The second and third sentences in this passage are much easier to 
understand than the first, which might be incomprehensible to read-
ers not accustomed to Peirce’s writing. The final sentence seems to 
counsel us, if we want to understand something, to look at the effects 
that thing has (identified as effects by their “practical bearings”).106
This was the stress that James and Dewey placed on the maxim in 
their own work,107 and it is very similar to the ideas at the core of 
Clark’s vision of pleading and civil litigation more generally. 
 But this emphasis on outcomes does not fully capture the maxim’s 
significance within Peirce’s own work. The maxim “was regarded by 
Peirce himself as a . . . rule[] and method for ascertaining the mean-
ing of signs.”108 One of the unfamiliar aspects of the first sentence in 
the maxim is its reference to “the third grade of apprehension.” This 
reference is characteristic of one of the most basic features of all of 
Peirce’s writing, his preoccupation with three-part or triadic analysis 
(as opposed to the two-part, dyadic analysis characteristic of philoso-
                                          
 103. See, e.g., T.L. SHORT, PEIRCE’S THEORY OF SIGNS 60-66 (2007). 
 104. See, e.g., H. S. THAYER, MEANING AND ACTION: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF 
PRAGMATISM 133, 165 (2d ed.1981). 
 105. Charles S. Peirce, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, 12 POP. SCI. MONTHLY 286 
(1878), reprinted in 5 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE para. 388, 402 
(Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1936) [hereinafter CP]. 
 106. Judge Posner often makes this equation in his work. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 153-54, 162 (1990); Richard A. Posner, The 
Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 866 (1988). 
 107. See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text. 
 108. THAYER, supra note 104, at 87. See also, e.g., John Dewey, The Pragmatism of Peirce,
13 J. PHIL. PSYCHOL. & SCI. METHODS 709, 710 (1916) (“Peirce confined the significance of 
the term [pragmatism] to the determination of the meaning of terms, or . . . propositions; 
the theory was not, of itself, a theory of the test, or the truth, of propositions.”). 
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phers from Plato through Descartes to Kant).109 This obsession some-
times led Peirce astray, but often led him to useful insights, as for 
example in his theory of signification, or “semeiotic.” 
 Peirce’s tripartite theory of signification may be familiar to some 
readers from its adoption by later (mostly nonpragmatist) writers.110
Peirce regarded every sign, or meaningful phenomenon, as composed 
of three aspects: the sign itself (also called the “representamen” or 
“sign-vehicle” by Peirce), the object (akin to the referent of the sign), 
and the interpretant (the dimension of the sign’s meaning, akin to 
the understanding we have of the relation between sign and object or 
to the product of that understanding, however manifested, as for 
example by our stepping on the brake pedal when we see a stop 
sign).111 Without all three components, Peirce argued, a sign does not 
function; signification, or meaning, occurs only when a sign acquires 
an interpretant, or is interpreted. Interpretants may be, and often 
are, themselves potential sign-vehicles.112 And signs, both as sign-
vehicles and as interpretants, need not be verbal, but can include 
other sensory phenomena.113 Although Peirce’s theory of signification 
may be understood and usefully applied without acquaintance with 
other aspects of his thought, it was not a free-standing theory in his 
writing but was, rather, intimately related to his triadic analysis of 
what he called the “categories” of experience and being, which he 
called firstness, secondness, and thirdness.114 Firstness Peirce identi-
fied as the aspect of reality consisting of pure quality, experienced as 
a kind of pure possibility (e.g., redness in the abstract).115 He called 
secondness the aspect of relation, experienced as constraint or effort 
(e.g., the pressure of the brake pedal against our foot when we brake 
at a stop sign).116 And thirdness he defined as the aspect of mediation, 
experienced as predictable regularity, intelligibility, and meaning 
                                          
 109. See, e.g., SHORT, supra note 103, at 27-90. 
 110. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 101, at 1408-13; see also generally UMBERTO ECO, A
THEORY OF SEMIOTICS (Thomas A. Sebeok ed., 1976); ROMAN JAKOBSON, ON LANGUAGE
(Linda R. Waugh & Monique Monville-Burston eds., 1990). 
 111. See, e.g., Charles S. Peirce, Sign, 2 DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY
527 (James Mark Baldwin ed., 1902), reprinted in PEIRCE ON SIGNS 239-40 (James Hoopes 
ed., 1991). 
 112. As Peirce’s follower Josiah Royce perceived, this theory implied that 
interpretation is an endless process. See generally JOHN E. SMITH, ROYCE’S SOCIAL
INFINITE: THE COMMUNITY OF INTERPRETATION (Archon Books 1969) (1950). 
 113. See, e.g., SHORT, supra note 103, at 151-206. 
 114. The literature on Peirce contains many explanations of the categories. For an 
introduction, see, for example, SANDRA B. ROSENTHAL, CHARLES PEIRCE’S PRAGMATIC
PLURALISM 77-82 (1994). Peirce maintained that the categories were irreducible, that is, 
that thirdness cannot be described fully in terms of qualities (firstness) and relations 
(secondness). See, e.g., Charles S. Peirce, A Guess at the Riddle, in PEIRCE ON SIGNS, supra
note 111, at 186, 192-93 (manuscript unpublished during Peirce’s lifetime); SHORT, supra
note 103, at 74. 
 115.  See, e.g., ROSENTHAL, supra note 114, at 77-82.   
 116.  See id.
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(e.g., our perception of the sign as a reason to stop the car).117 Peirce 
understood verbal meaning as just one instance of thirdness among 
many others, including natural laws and behavioral regularities of 
other kinds.118 This understanding explicitly discarded a number of 
assumptions basic to common understandings of meaningfulness in 
Peirce’s day (and our own), most important among them the notion 
that meaning is reducible to communicative intention or, alternatively, 
to some state of affairs (a referent) in the world. Both of these corre-
spondence-based conceptions of meaning are dyadic (focusing on the 
collapse of sign into intention or referent), and Peirce viewed them as 
basically flawed for this reason.119
 This sketch of Peirce’s ideas is very abbreviated. One of the im-
portant points to take from it is that Peirce saw his theory of signifi-
cation as related to the most basic features of a broader philosophical 
system. As James and Dewey developed Peirce’s ideas for a wider 
audience within their own thought, they did not further develop his 
account of meaning. Instead, they usually took the phenomenon of 
meaning for granted. In fact, in some respects they endorsed ac-
counts of meaning that Peirce had explicitly rejected.120 James, for 
example, sometimes embraced the correspondence theory of truth 
that Peirce criticized.121 (A correspondence theory of truth, analogous 
to a correspondence theory of meaning, holds that a proposition is 
true if it carries a meaning that corresponds to or in some way copies 
reality; such a theory is dyadic.) Dewey’s instrumentalist conception 
of truth as “warranted assertability”122 also coexisted in his work 
with a correspondence theory of truth and meaning.123 Yet it was 
James’s and Dewey’s versions of pragmatism, and especially Dewey’s 
commitments to process, voluntarism, and democracy, that most 
directly influenced Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 
similar commitments shaped Clark’s understanding of the cause of 
action in terms of trial convenience, his reconceptualization of the 
functions of pleading in terms of notice and sensibly managed decisions 
                                          
 117.  See id.
 118. See, e.g., Peirce, supra note 111, at 239-40. 
 119. See SHORT, supra note 103, at 16-18. 
 120. See, e.g., THAYER, supra note 104, at 146 (noting that James “apparently had little 
interest in enunciating . . . a theory” of meaning, and that while “Peirce undertook to 
explicate the idea of meaning[,] James was concerned to explicate the meanings of ideas”). 
 121. See, e.g., Richard M. Gale, William James’s Semantics of “Truth,” 33 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOC’Y 863, 866-67 (1997); H. S. Thayer, On 
William James on Truth, 13 TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOC’Y 3, 6 (1977). 
 122. John Dewey, Propositions, Warranted Assertability, and Truth, 38 J. PHIL. 169, 
169 (1941). 
 123. See, e.g., id. at 178-79, 183; H. S. Thayer, Two Theories of Truth: The Relation 
Between the Theories of John Dewey and Bertrand Russell, 44 J. PHIL. 516 (1947) (arguing 
that Dewey’s conception of truth is basically compatible with Russell’s logical 
correspondence theory). 
2012]  IQBAL AND INTERPRETATION 445
on the merits, his disregard for the text of complaints, and his con-
comitant focus on the facts presumed to lie behind that text.124 In this 
way, pragmatist approaches to decisionmaking and justification have 
come to coexist with correspondence theories of meaning and truth in 
mainstream contemporary American legal thought on procedure. 
 Judge Richard Posner’s work on pragmatism and legal interpreta-
tion offers an example of the form taken by this simplified pragmatism 
and the difficulty of meshing it fully with sophisticated accounts of 
interpretation. Over the past several decades, Judge Posner has self-
consciously articulated a platform of pragmatic adjudication.125 The 
central planks in his platform are context-sensitivity and instrumen-
talism.126 The pragmatic adjudicator, to Judge Posner, is one who 
considers not just legal authorities but all relevant information in 
reaching the decisions likely to have the best short- and long-term 
consequences.127 For Judge Posner, unlike Judge Clark, pragmatism 
does not require distaste for issues of textual meaning. Indeed, Judge 
Posner has written extensively on problems in legal interpretation.128
                                          
 124. See, e.g., Desautels-Stein, supra note 98; Marcus, supra note 66. 
 125. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 165, 168-69, 198 
(2001) [hereinafter POSNER, FRONTIERS]; RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 13-14, 
202-03, 345-46 (2008) [hereinafter POSNER, THINK]; RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW,
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003) [hereinafter POSNER, DEMOCRACY]; RICHARD A.
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 2-21, 387-405 (1995) [hereinafter POSNER, OVERCOMING]; 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 82, 112, 119, 
(1999) [hereinafter POSNER, PROBLEMATICS]; POSNER, supra note 106, at 14, 108, 192; 
Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM, supra note 
100, at 235 [hereinafter Posner, Adjudication]; Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law As 
an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 763 (1987) [hereinafter 
Posner, Decline]; Posner, supra note 106, at 829, 866; Richard A. Posner, Tribute to Ronald 
Dworkin and a Note on Pragmatic Adjudication, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 9, 9-14 
(2007); Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653 
(1990) [hereinafter Posner, Offer].  
 126. Similarly, Thomas Grey defines legal pragmatism as a “practical” orientation 
toward law, characterized by a blending of “contextualist and . . . instrumentalist strands 
of legal thought” that replicates Jamesian and Deweyan popularized pragmatism. Thomas 
C. Grey, Freestanding Legal Pragmatism, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM, supra note 
100, at 256. In Grey’s understanding, legal pragmatism is not concerned with questions 
of meaning or textual detail; like most proceduralists since Clark, Grey seems to find 
legal communications interesting only insofar as they function as means to other ends. See 
id. at 254-57. 
 127. See, e.g., Posner, Adjudication, supra note 125, at 235, 240 (“[T]he positivist starts 
with and gives more weight to the authorities, while the pragmatist starts with and gives 
more weight to the facts.”); POSNER, THINK, supra note 125, at 202-03; id at 248 (“Good 
pragmatic judges balance two types of consequence, the case-specific and the systemic.”). 
 128. See, e.g., POSNER, THINK, supra note 125, at 113, 193-202. See also, e.g., POSNER,
OVERCOMING, supra note 125, at 155, 199, 215-16; POSNER, supra note 106, at 40, 42, 60; 
Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1368-80 (1990); Richard A. 
Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the 
Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179 (1987); Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the 
Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1576 (1969); Richard A. 
Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 800 (1983). 
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And in some respects, his account of interpretation recalls Peirce’s. In 
a recent book, for example, Judge Posner described interpretation as 
a “quintessentially intuitive human faculty,” “not a rule-bound activi-
ty,” but rather one based on “experience[, which] creates a repository 
of buried knowledge on which intuition can draw when one is faced 
with a new interpretandum.”129 While this view seems indebted to 
Peirce,130 divorced from Peirce’s broader conceptual framework, this 
type of flexible understanding of meaning and interpretation is 
vulnerable to criticism as unprincipled and unpredictable.131 And 
when pushed, Judge Posner acknowledges the value of “accuracy” in 
interpretation, which seems for him to be dependent on a corre-
spondence theory of meaning.132 For Peirce, in contrast, meaning was 
by definition principled and predictable, even though it could not 
always be known with certainty. 
Thus, Judge Posner’s position ultimately seems consistent with 
the form of pragmatism adopted by Clark. The difficulty this position 
has with issues of interpretation is even more visible in the commen-
tary on Iqbal, reconsidered in the next Section. 
3.   The Effect on Responses to Iqbal
 The commentary discussed in Parts I.B and I.C bears the marks of 
Clark’s expressed vision, including his teleological view of pleading 
doctrine and the instrumentalist values associated with notice plead-
ing. The responses to Iqbal also share the later pragmatists’ and 
                                          
 129. POSNER, THINK, supra note 125, at 113; see also id. at 193. 
 130. Judge Posner has never referred to Peirce as an influence on his thinking about 
legal interpretation, aside from occasional citation of Peirce as the originator of the idea of 
“interpretive community.” See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 106, at 450; Richard A. Posner, 
Conventionalism: The Key to Law as an Autonomous Discipline?, 38 U. TORONTO L.J. 333, 
339 (1988). When he has addressed Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, Judge Posner paraphrases 
it as a consequentialist directive: meaning equals effects. See supra note 106. Most often, 
he simply refers to Peirce as a founder of pragmatism. See, e.g., POSNER, DEMOCRACY,
supra note 125, at 100-01, 139; POSNER, OVERCOMING, supra note 125, at 388, 396, 450, 
459; RICHARD A. POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS: A STUDY OF DECLINE 231-32 (2008); 
POSNER, supra note 106, at 16 n.25, 27, 436 n.17, 450, 462-64; Posner, Decline, supra note 
125, at 763; Posner, Offer, supra note 125, at 1654-55; Posner, supra note 106, at 879-80 
n.90. Less often, he distinguishes Peirce from the main pragmatist tradition. See, e.g.,
POSNER, DEMOCRACY, supra note 125, at 24-25, 26 n.6. 
 131. For the classic critique of legal pragmatism along these lines, see, for example, 
RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES (2006); Ronald Dworkin, Pragmatism, Right Answers, 
and True Banality, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY 359 (Michael Brint & William 
Weaver eds., 1991). 
 132. See, e.g., POSNER, THINK, supra note 125, at 198 (“[T]he accuracy of a literal 
interpretation of a legislative text is easier to evaluate than the soundness of a pragmatic 
interpretation.”). On Judge Posner’s inconsistency on this point, see also Lake, supra note 
98, at 564, 578-80, 596-97, 604, 615-16, 618-19, 645, Tibor R. Machan, Posner’s Rortyite 
(Pragmatic) Jurisprudence, 40 AM. J. JURIS. 361, 362, 366-68, 375 (1995), and Richard 
Rorty, Dewey and Posner on Pragmatism and Moral Progress, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 915, 920-
23 (2007). 
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Clark’s lack of interest in issues of interpretation and the related de-
nial that interpretation should play any role in the pleading process. 
 Virtually every commentator on Twombly and Iqbal has adopted 
Clark’s narrative of the development of pleading doctrine. Many dis-
cussions reiterate Clark’s three-phase narrative.133 Some contend that 
Twombly and Iqbal signal reversion to the fact pleading regime.134
Others suggest that we have, for better or worse, entered a fourth 
post-Clark phase.135 But both positions are faithful to Clark’s basic 
story. Commentators also widely endorse Clark’s account of notice 
pleading as intended to minimize formalities, increase access, and 
facilitate adjudication on the merits.136 Interestingly, it is commen-
tary by judges that comes closest to rejecting Clark’s narrative.137
                                          
 133. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 57, at 448; Gressette, supra note 54, at 403-11; 
Hannon, supra note 54, at 1812-14; Muhammad Umair Khan, Tortured Pleadings: The 
Historical Development and Recent Fall of the Liberal Pleadings Standard, 3 ALB. GOV’T L.
REV. 460, 477-81 (2010); Klein, supra note 56, at 474-78; Moline, supra note 57, at 163-77; 
Schwartz & Appel, supra note 4, at 1111-21; Subrin, supra note 4, at 378-79; Sullivan, 
supra note 3, at 8-17. 
 134. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 52, at 859-64 (“Iqbal’s novel doctrinal contribution is to 
subdivide the pleading analysis formally into two prongs, with the first prong sorting legal 
conclusions from factual allegations. . . . The distinction . . . was an important feature of 
nineteenth century code pleading, but the Federal Rules . . . eliminated it. . . .”); Halaby, 
supra note 2, at 38 (“[F]ederal court plaintiffs and defendants seem destined to rejoin 
battle on just what is a mere conclusion, as opposed to a factual allegation[, like] . . . . those 
long-departed legions of lawyers whose skirmishes on that front taught us to fight our 
procedural battles elsewhere . . . .”); Hartnett, supra note 8, at 486 (admitting “worry 
that . . . Twombly means the resurrection of concepts that the drafters of the Federal 
Rules . . . thought they had left behind,” namely, “distinctions between evidentiary facts, 
ultimate facts, and legal conclusions” that were “crucial to code pleading”); Herrmann, 
Beck & Burbank, supra note 52, at 161 (in contribution by Burbank, describing decisions 
as imposing “a system of complaint-parsing that is hard to distinguish from that which the 
drafters of the Federal Rules explicitly rejected”). 
 135. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 3, at 850 (“[I]t is quite hard to resist the 
conclusion that the Justices inadvertently stumbled into a new procedural era.”); 
Gressette, supra note 54, at 449-50; Kilaru, supra note 3, at 908; Marcus, supra note 4, at 
412; Roger Michael Michalski, Tremors of Things to Come: The Great Split Between Federal 
and State Pleading Standards, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 111 (2010); Schwartz & Appel, 
supra note 4, at 1110; Spencer, supra note 3, at 368; Smith, supra note 4, at 1055 
(describing Iqbal as an “evolution in the pleading standard that is likely to increase the 
efficiency and fairness of modern civil practice”); Spencer, supra note 51, at 441-42. 
 136. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 3, at 111; Coleman, supra note 52, at 285; Jois, 
supra note 3, at 901; Miller, supra note 52, at 2; Ryan Mize, Comment, From Plausibility to 
Clarity: An Analysis of the Implications of Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Possible Remedies, 58 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1245, 1249 (2010); Michael Moffitt, Three Things to Be Against (“Settlement” 
Not Included), 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1221 & n.64 (2009); Pocker, supra note 4, at 38; 
Rothman, supra note 52, at 2; Spencer, supra note 3, at 354; Spencer, supra note 55, at 2; 
Tice, supra note 51, at 833-34; Nicolas Tymoczko, Note, Between the Possible and the 
Probable: Defining the Plausibility Standard After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 94 MINN. L. REV. 505, 508 (2009). 
 137. See Kourlis, Singer & Knowlton, supra note 56, at 246 (“The new [Federal Rules] 
system was innovative, and the theory behind it reasonable. [But i]n hindsight, . . . 
removing the issue-narrowing function [of the common-law system] from pleadings has 
proven to be a serious mistake.”); Levin, supra note 57, at 144. 
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 The majority view of Twombly and Iqbal as disruptions of the 
Clark-Conley system has led to confusion about the extent to which 
the recent decisions should be considered “pragmatic.” Clark’s narra-
tive is, rightly, closely associated with pragmatism, at least of the 
simplified kind described above. Understanding Twombly and Iqbal
as departures from that narrative would seem to entail understanding 
them as antipragmatic. And accounts of the decisions that describe 
them as harking back to the fact pleading era do indeed describe 
them as renouncing a commitment to the pragmatic notice pleading 
regime.138 But commentators have also characterized Twombly and 
Iqbal as pragmatic decisions, usually in a less positive sense.139 On 
this view, the decisions’ pretextual cloaking of policy judgments in 
procedural trappings and their conferral of unbounded discretion on 
trial court judges reflect and license result-oriented decisionmaking 
constrained only by personal preferences.140
 This confusion in contemporary applications of the “pragmatic” 
label is, in the pleading context, a corollary of the developments 
described earlier, especially the habit of denying that the screening of 
pleadings has anything to do with considering the language in which 
the pleadings are presented, itself the product of a merging of conse-
quentialist policy assessment with correspondence theories of meaning 
and truth. In the specific context of twenty-first-century pleading 
doctrine, these traditions can help to explain, for example, the wide-
spread misapprehension that the “plausibility” standard requires 
plaintiffs to offer “evidentiary support” for their allegations in the 
complaint itself.141 Commentators reach this conclusion because they 
are conditioned to think of the contents of a complaint not as verbal 
propositions, but as directly reflecting or somehow constituting facts 
in the world. The same conditioning explains the negative tone used 
by most of the commentators who do acknowledge that Twombly and 
Iqbal seem to require judges to interpret complaints.142 Stephen 
                                          
 138. See sources cited supra note 134. 
 139. Judge Posner himself, writing before the Iqbal decision, called Twombly
“pragmatic.” POSNER, THINK, supra note 125, at 53-54; see also Scott Dodson, Justice 
Souter and the Civil Rules, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 289, 298 (2010) (calling Twombly
“nonoriginalist and pragmatic”); Tidmarsh, supra note 56, at 407-08 (noting that the 
“modern procedural system was built largely on the foundations of Roscoe Pound’s [Realist] 
vision” of “a simple, uniform, discretionary, ‘decide each case on its merits’ approach to 
legal procedure,” the “deep flaws” of which became evident only over time). 
 140. See sources cited supra notes 49-52. 
 141. See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 19, at 1328-33 (discussing this trend in reception of 
Iqbal). To similar effect are arguments that the standards invade the province of the jury. 
See, e.g., Flake, supra note 3, at 992; Kilaru, supra note 3, at 925-26; Spencer, supra note 
60, at 199; see also sources cited supra note 50. 
 142. See, e.g., Burbank, General Rules, supra note 52, at 535 (describing standard as 
“invitation to the lower courts to make ad hoc decisions reflecting buried policy choices”); 
Chemerinsky, supra note 3, at 290-91 (“What is plausible and credible to one district judge 
is not going to be plausible and credible to another.”); Eichhorn, supra note 52, at 953 
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Burbank, for example, has described the “architecture of Iqbal’s mischief 
. . . [a]s the power the Court claimed to parse a complaint.”143 Virtually 
all of those who have noted Iqbal’s implication that a judge must 
interpret a complaint in order to determine its sufficiency similarly 
regard this implication as disastrous.144
 Only one commentator, Robert Bone, has acknowledged without 
panic that Twombly and Iqbal indicate that a judge must interpret a 
complaint in order to assess its sufficiency:   
The complaint is supposed to give a coherent account of the 
relevant events and transactions involved in the dispute.  
Therefore, it must be interpreted as a coherent whole, and the 
sufficiency of its allegations must be evaluated in a holistic way. 
The Twombly Court understood this point clearly. . . . Justice 
Souter also understood this fundamental point in his Iqbal dissent. 
He interpreted the key allegations in the context of the complaint 
as a whole before concluding that the plausibility standard was 
met. It follows from the holistic nature of pleading analysis that 
                                                                                                
(“[B]y drawing on a metaphor of judging-as-measuring, the Court . . . deflects attention 
from the unbounded discretion that the opinion grants to judges who will administer that 
test.”); Gist, supra note 20, at 1037 (noting that in ruling on a motion to dismiss, a judge “is 
simply interpreting what a short plain statement means to him”); Herrmann, Beck & 
Burbank, supra note 52, at 161 (Burbank, closing statement) (describing decisions as 
imposing “a system of complaint-parsing that is hard to distinguish from that which the 
drafters of the Federal Rules explicitly rejected”); Kilaru, supra note 3, at 919-20 
(“Twombly and Iqbal give lower courts a tremendous power that they did not have 
before. . . . Yet at the same time, the disagreement between Justices Souter and Kennedy 
on what constitutes a ‘conclusory’ allegation reveals that the distinction is as manipulable 
as it is powerful.”); Miller, supra note 52, at 26 (describing “judicial experience and 
common sense” as “highly ambiguous and subjective concepts largely devoid of accepted—
let alone universal—meaning”); Mohan, supra note 52, at 1197 (“The looseness of the Iqbal
test allows for a disparate range of interpretations about what is conclusory and what is 
plausible.”); Rothman, supra note 52, at 2 (“Iqbal has the potential to short-circuit the 
adversary process by shutting the doors of federal courthouses . . . to . . . legitimate claims 
based on what amounts to a district court judge’s effectively irrefutable, subjective 
assessment of probable success.”); Allison Sirica, Case Comment, The New Federal 
Pleading Standard: Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), 62 FLA. L. REV. 547, 555 
(2010) (noting general consensus of most commentators that the plausibility standard “may 
result in highly subjective judgments and inconsistent results among trial courts”); Suja A. 
Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851, 1885
(2008) (“[T]he court makes a substantive interpretative judgment [under Twombly] as to 
how much evidence is sufficient evidence.”); Tice, supra note 51, at 827 (noting that 
Twombly leaves “lower courts and plaintiffs’ lawyers . . . significant leeway to tease out the 
meaning of ‘plausibility’ in different contexts”); Capital Report, supra note 47, at 10 
(“[Professor] Burbank . . . cautioned that the court’s misguided decision will lead to a 
‘whole new brand of mischief’ in which trial judges subjectively dismiss complaints.”). 
 Although Noll does not take a critical view of “the many interpretative questions the 
Court's decision left open,” the questions to which he refers are primarily questions of the 
interpretation of Iqbal as precedent, not the interpretation of complaints. Noll, supra note 
48, at 117. 
 143. Burbank, supra note 3, at 115. 
 144. See sources cited supra note 142; see also, e.g., Peddie, supra note 52, at 54 (noting 
criticisms that Iqbal licenses judges to “dismiss complaints that appear implausible based 
only on caprice or ‘judicial experience and common sense’ ”). 
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there is no conceptual distinction between the two parts of Iqbal’s 
two-pronged approach. . . . The reason certain allegations are 
conclusory is that the complaint, interpreted with them in it, does 
not meet the pleading standard for the legal element the defective 
allegations are meant to support.145
Professor Bone is unusual in noting that both Twombly and Iqbal 
displayed an understanding that judges engage in the interpretation 
of complaints when deciding motions to dismiss. Professor Bone does 
not, however, explicitly defend the holistic approach to interpretation 
that he endorses. More particularly, he does not explain why we need 
not fear that even if all judges considered all pleadings holistically, judg-
es might still reach inconsistent conclusions about their sufficiency. 
 The combination of acceptance of Clark’s vision of pleading and 
this vision’s rejection of the role played by interpretation in the 
pleading process further explains the Catch-22 criticism of Iqbal
described above, which depends on the assumption that a plaintiff 
cannot allege facts that the plaintiff does not know to be true. It also 
explains the judicial discretion critique, which depends on the as-
sumption that the conclusoriness and plausibility of allegations 
cannot be assessed on a stable, intersubjective basis but are neces-
sarily subjective and unpredictable. And it explains the legitimacy 
critique; most forms of this argument rest on a positivist-style dis-
tinction between the judicial interpretation of legal rules (understood 
as subjective and hence illegitimate) and legislatively enacted rules 
themselves (understood as objective, democratically generated, and 
hence legitimate). All of these responses to the Court’s recent plead-
ing decisions have their source in the developments described above. 
B.   Taking Interpretation Out of Procedure and Putting It Back In 
 The prevailing understanding of Twombly and Iqbal as pragmatic 
in a negative sense because they countenance the interpretation of 
complaints is the result of abandonment of Peirce’s concern with 
meaning in the popularization of pragmatism. The disappearance of 
this concern from the vocabularies of, first, popularized pragmatism 
and then twentieth-century proceduralism was not inevitable, but it 
was probably overdetermined. The reappearance of the concern now 
is cause not for distress, but for optimism. 
                                          
 145.  Bone, supra note 52, at 868-69. Cf. Hartnett, supra note 8, at 498 (“The need to 
rely on experience and common sense in drawing inferences is hardly radical—it is a staple 
of inductive reasoning, which in turn is at the heart of our system of adjudication.”); Miller, 
supra note 57, at 1005 (observing that Iqbal “lays bare both the fact that pleading doctrine 
is a form of ‘choice architecture’ and that the materials used to build that architecture are 
seriously, and ineluctably, deficient,” and describing Iqbal as “one of the unusual cases that 
expose the meager and borrowed nature of the materials with which we build this 
architecture,” namely, language). 
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 1.   Why the Avoidance of Interpretation? 
 Is pragmatism compatible with an understanding of interpreta-
tion that is not uselessly subjective and instrumentalist? Peirce’s 
ideas suggest that it is. The turn away from Peirce’s understanding 
of interpretation resulted mainly not from the incoherence of that 
understanding but from developments in the twentieth-century acad-
emy, including the legal academy. 
 As noted above, James and Dewey, like Clark, mostly regarded 
issues of signification, meaning, and interpretation as at best trivial 
and at worst dangerous.146 The dyadic, correspondence-based concep-
tion of meaning to which they sometimes resorted precluded an un-
derstanding of verbal meaning, and interpretation, as intersubjective 
and thus stable and predictable, even if not mechanically produced. A 
dualistic conception of meaning (one that identifies a good interpreta-
tion as involving an interpreter’s “matching” a particular sign to its 
referent or to the intention with which it was produced) reduces each 
instance of interpretation to an individual act of judgment. Such a 
conception cannot account for why different interpreters might be 
expected to form consistent judgments, or interpretants. Peirce’s 
account of signification as a three-part phenomenon embedded in a 
three-aspect reality, in contrast, tied meaning to the most basic 
structures of regularity in general; thirdness, for Peirce, was the 
realm not just of signification but also of natural laws and habit.147
For him, perceiving meaning was just one way of tapping into preex-
isting regularity. The possibility of meaningfulness, in Peirce’s view, 
precedes perceptions of regularity and makes such perceptions possi-
ble. While different individuals may, due to divergent experiences, 
perceive different aspects of this regularity when they interpret 
signs, on Peirce’s theory, it should usually be possible to mediate be-
tween differing judgments by enlarging the interpreters’ frames of 
reference. Despite their interests in pluralism, James and Dewey left 
all of these notions behind when they introduced pragmatism—in the 
sense of a concern with practical engagement and effectiveness—to 
the wider public. In the process, pragmatism lost its foundation in a 
positive intersubjective conception of stable meaning.  
                                          
 146. See supra notes 109-23 and accompanying text. 
 147. See, e.g., Vincent Colapietro, Habit, Competence, and Purpose: How to Make the 
Grades of Clarity Clearer, 45 TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOC’Y. 348, 355 
(2009); Marjorie C. Miller, Peirce’s Conception of Habit, in PEIRCE’S DOCTRINE OF SIGNS:
THEORY, APPLICATIONS, AND CONNECTIONS 71, 74 (Vincent M. Colapietro & Thomas M. 
Olshewsky eds., 1996) (“[H]abit, as a tendency to act, is generality-in-the-making, the 
mediation between first and second which is the institution of a third.”); Richard Rorty, 
Pragmatism, Categories, and Language, 70 PHIL. REV. 197, 210 (1961) (noting that “[s]ign” 
and “[h]abit” were for Peirce “two of the most important sobriquets of thirdness”). 
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 After pragmatism was popularized, its influence on American 
academic philosophy waned, making revival of Peirce’s perspective 
increasingly unlikely in that forum. Through the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, the philosophical study of meaning returned mostly to analysis 
of the kind Peirce had criticized.148 The neopragmatist revival in the 
American academy of the 1980s was mainly a revival of Deweyan 
pragmatism and thus did not lead academics directly back to 
Peirce.149 Although they were nominally concerned with “interpreta-
tion,” pragmatist revivalists generally approached the topic from the 
more dyadic perspective of hermeneutics.150
 Independent of any strictly philosophical influences, legal com-
mentary on the subject of interpretation developed along parallel 
lines. Throughout the entire period addressed by this Article, such 
commentary has been preoccupied with figuring out how meanings in 
general—and legal meaning in particular—can be made stable and 
predictably effective. Typical of many twentieth-century approaches 
to these issues was the perspective advanced by Peirce’s contemporary 
James Bradley Thayer, who denigrated judicial interpretation as a 
mechanical exercise unsuited for important political decisionmak-
ing.151 Thayer’s position was echoed in legal realists’ critiques of the 
rhetoric associated with legal interpretation, especially statutory 
interpretation, in the early twentieth century.152 Over the next hundred 
years, the most visible and influential work on legal interpretation 
never stopped puzzling over the question of whether interpretive dis-
cretion, and interpretation itself, were inimical to law or synonymous 
with it.153
 In the area of civil procedure, as described above, legal academics 
quickly accepted the Dewey-Clark vision of pragmatism, which left 
no room for the operation of interpretation within procedure. After 
1938, academic proceduralists seeking to justify their scholarship as 
having some significance for the real world of litigation shifted their 
focus from the pre-Rules concern with formalities to a Clark-style 
                                          
 148. The wartime influx of European émigrés into American philosophy departments 
shifted the center of gravity of academic philosophy toward the kind of conceptual analysis 
that the classic pragmatists had combated. For a general discussion, see SHORT, supra note 
103, at 91-144, 263-346. 
 149. See supra note 102. 
 150. See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979); see also
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1990). 
 151. See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 138 (1893). 
 152. See, e.g., Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory 
Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1259 (1947); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory 
of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 
VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950) [hereinafter Llewellyn, 1950]; K. N. Llewellyn, The Constitution 
as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934). 
 153. See, e.g., Karen Petroski, Does It Matter What We Say About Legal Interpretation?,
43 MCGEORGE L. REV. (forthcoming 2012). 
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emphasis on individual outcomes and system-wide effects.154 Debates 
about procedure, and pleading in particular, tended to turn on dis-
agreements about which systemic effects to promote and the best 
devices for promoting them.155 The same focus is visible throughout 
the commentary on Iqbal, including commentary taking a less critical 
view of the decision.156 This consistency is understandable. Procedur-
alists today continue to face disincentives to think of trial court judges 
as interpreters of complaints. If interpretation is conceived in dyadic 
terms, it seems inherently unstable, so acknowledging its role in the 
screening of claims for litigation can seem to concede the futility of 
any procedural recommendations directed at rationally governing 
subsequent stages of a lawsuit. Few procedural commentators are 
likely to be eager to imply the irrelevance of their recommendations 
in this way. 
 The result of all of these developments is the scenario we face fol-
lowing Iqbal: one in which judges appear to recognize the role of 
interpretation in screening pleadings, either explicitly or implicitly, 
but in which neither they nor commentators have access to a vocabu-
lary for communicating this recognition positively.   
 2.   What If We Did Not Avoid the Issue? 
 Perhaps James, Dewey, and Clark were right to turn away from 
Peirce’s concern with interpretation. Does it not just complicate 
things unnecessarily? No; in fact, there might be much to gain from 
considering the similarities (and differences) between the scrutiny of 
pleadings and other forms of legal interpretation. First, as Iqbal indi-
cates, judges already recognize these similarities, even if only implic-
itly. Any account of the treatment of pleadings that does not 
acknowledge the similarities is therefore descriptively incomplete. 
Second, although the main approach to legal interpretation in other 
areas has been dyadic and subjectivist, a more Peircean conception 
has persisted alongside that prevailing view. We thus have familiar 
grounds for acknowledging the place of interpretation in procedure in 
a way that does not open the door to radical unpredictability. Third, 
if these first two points are granted, the scholarly literature and 
doctrine pertaining to the interpretation of other kinds of legal texts 
offers a vast resource for ideas about how Twombly and Iqbal should 
and will be implemented. 
 First, the analysis suggested by Iqbal requires the interpretation 
of complaints in a sense that differs from the mainstream under-
standing of that activity, but that is consistent with what has always 
                                          
 154. See supra notes 84-86, 106, and accompanying text. 
 155. See supra notes 52, 58, and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. 
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occurred on motions to dismiss.157 From close up—when one studies 
complaints, or orders on motions to dismiss, one at a time, focusing 
on the legal standards cited and the reasons given for judicial conclu-
sions—it is not always easy to see how similarly district court judges 
treat complaints and other legal texts. This is not a new practice.158
Most district court orders on motions to dismiss, both before and after 
Twombly and Iqbal, include extensive quotations from complaints, 
often in quantities far exceeding quotations from legal authority.159
Quotations from complaints anchor orders in the details of cases, just 
as quotations from precedent anchor them in the law. Further, over 
time, complaint text handled in this way takes on properties of legal 
authority. As later orders on motions to dismiss cite previous orders, 
the new orders sometimes include in their citations the previous or-
ders’ quotations from complaints.160 Material that originally appeared 
in a complaint can thus be transformed from litigants’ allegations 
into legally significant formulations, causing the distinction between 
factual allegations and legal conclusions to shift or even disappear.161
Considered in this way, judicial practice on motions to dismiss has 
always involved interpretation not just in the subjectivist sense but 
also in the Peircean sense: it has involved the generation of new 
signs (orders ruling on motions to dismiss) marking the emergence of 
“interpretants” out of judges’ (and parties’) encounters with those 
signs we refer to as complaints (as well as briefing and arguments), and 
giving rise to new instances of interpretation. The patterns in com-
munication and behavior constituted and revealed by such practices 
are the patterns of meaningfulness recognized in complaints. They 
                                          
 157. The assertions contained in the rest of this paragraph are based the author’s 
original study of 136 district court orders from July 2006, 2008, and 2009 issued in the 
Southern District of New York (the district of origin of Twombly) and in the Eastern 
District of New York (the district of origin of Iqbal) deciding 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motions. The 
list of orders considered was generated by a Westlaw search on the term “12(b)(6)” in the 
relevant periods and districts (orders mentioning 12(b)(6) motions without deciding one 
were discarded). The number of orders examined per year and district was, for 2006, 41 
orders, 15 from the Eastern District of New York (E.D.N.Y.) and 26 from the Southern 
District of New York (S.D.N.Y.); for 2008, 47 orders, 16 from the E.D.N.Y. and 31 from the 
S.D.N.Y.; and for 2009, 48 orders, 11 from the E.D.N.Y. and 37 from the S.D.N.Y.. 
 158. Before Twombly, courts sometimes cited authority referring to the “construal” and 
“interpretation” of pleadings, especially pro se pleadings. See, e.g., Roth ex rel. Beacon 
Power Corp. v. Perseus, L.L.C., No. 05 Civ. 10466 (RPP), 2006 WL 2129331 (S.D.N.Y. July 
31, 2006). In this context, however, “interpreting” a pleading sometimes amounted to a 
confession that the court would be exercising its judgment regarding the meaning of a 
complaint, reflecting the subjective conception of interpretation held by Clark. 
 159. Only nine of the 136 orders studied include no citations to the plaintiff’s 
complaint. Several of these exceptions extensively cite and quote other dispositive 
documents incorporated by reference in the complaint. 
 160. See, e.g., Adelphia Recovery Trust v. Bank of Am., N.A., 646 F. Supp. 2d 489 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 161. This possibility is reminiscent of Cook’s argument that what counts as “legal 
language” is not static but shifts as legal professionals’ practices change. See supra notes 
75-82 and accompanying text. 
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are also the content of what Justice Kennedy called district court 
judges’ “experience and common sense” with respect to civil com-
plaints.162 Indeed, rather than licensing courts to decide motions to 
dismiss any way they wish, Iqbal seems simply to have inspired dis-
trict court judges and their clerks to find new (yet still recognizable) 
ways to describe the regularities that this process involves.163
 Second, as this discussion suggests, recognizing that the screening 
of pleadings involves their interpretation does not require us to con-
sider the process unstable. Justice Kennedy’s reference in Iqbal to 
“experience and common sense” as an aspect of the legal standard 
may suggest that he, at least, considers interpretation to be a stable 
enough process to function as such.164 (And in other areas of law, we 
are willing to accept legal standards that include interpretation as a 
component, one of the best known being the Chevron standard, dis-
cussed below.) Although Justice Souter disagreed with Justice Ken-
nedy’s understanding of Iqbal’s complaint, Justice Souter appeared to 
share Justice Kennedy’s assumption on this point; like Professor 
Bone,165 Justice Souter presented his own reading of the complaint as 
the one that should strike more readers as correct (and if Peirce is 
right, then the “holistic” approach recommended by Justice Souter 
and Professor Bone is a more accurate description of how verbal and 
legal meaning arise).166 Both approaches resemble Judge Posner’s 
and are aligned with the most sophisticated contemporary accounts 
of legal interpretation. These accounts acknowledge—as did Peirce 
and his contemporary Holmes167—that while interpretation is not a 
mechanical process and may involve some variation, intersubjective 
practices do limit it, making some assertions about meaning more 
defensible than others.168 The growing interest in using empirical 
methods to examine issues of interpretation is based on similar 
premises.169 This perspective on interpretation does not assume that 
all regularity is best explained in terms of mechanical compulsion 
(Peirce’s secondness); it allows that some regularity may occur 
                                          
 162. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). 
 163. See infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text. 
 164. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 
 165. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 166. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1960-61 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 167. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 
417 (1899). 
 168. Much work in this vein is influenced by LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 1953), and a good sample is the collection LAW 
AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995).  
 169. For a recent example, see FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2009). An early qualitative version of this approach was 
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960). 
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through a more complex process that we can describe only from a 
more distant point of view (Peirce’s thirdness).170
 Finally, if the scrutiny of complaints has always involved interpre-
tation, and if this need not mean that the process is a free-for-all, 
then we should be able to look to thought about the interpretation of 
other kinds of legal texts to understand what courts are doing in the 
wake of Twombly and Iqbal, and to identify useful models for the 
analysis of particular complaints or types of complaints. The litera-
ture on legal interpretation offers a rich resource for the analysis of 
pleading practice. The final Part of this Article explores some of the 
ways this material might usefully orient discussion of how Iqbal
should be implemented. 
IV.   PLEADING SCRUTINY AS A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
 Pleading scrutiny has always been a matter of interpretation: a 
matter of finding legal significance in a text and basing conclusions 
about legal action on reasons drawn from that text. Iqbal has merely 
made this fact more difficult to deny than it previously was. In addi-
tion, of course, the Iqbal opinions also present specific principles for 
courts to use in scrutinizing complaints: the recommendation that 
courts decline to extend the presumption of truth to conclusory alle-
gations, and the Twombly-derived requirement that nonconclusory 
allegations plausibly suggest a claim to relief.171 If pleading scrutiny 
(under Iqbal as before) is a matter of interpretation, it should be 
possible to clarify application of these principles using resources 
drawn from other legal interpretation contexts. This Part explores, 
first, how the conclusoriness standard might be illuminated by ideas 
about gap-filling in contract law and superfluity in statutory and con-
tractual interpretation, and then how work on judicial deference to 
administrative agency interpretations might help us to think critically 
about the plausibility standard in a structured way. 
A.   Conclusoriness, Gap-Filling, and Superfluity 
 As noted, Justice Kennedy’s reference in Iqbal to the treatment of 
“legal conclusions” is reminiscent of the early twentieth-century 
“statement of facts” debate.172 But resuming this debate, without 
more, is unlikely to resolve all of our questions about how the conclu-
soriness principle should be implemented. This Section considers two 
concepts developed to address parallel issues that arise in the inter-
pretation of other kinds of legal texts: the concepts of filling gaps in 
                                          
 170. See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text. 
 171. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950; see also supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text. 
 172. See supra notes 75-82, 134, and accompanying text. 
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incomplete contracts and of avoiding superfluities in statutory as 
well as contractual text.  
 1.   Gap-Filling 
 Complaints have some unexpected functional similarities to con-
tracts. Like complaints, contracts are drafted by individual parties—
usually not by government bodies—to address particular situations. 
Also like complaints, they establish and articulate a relation between 
(at least) two parties. To be sure, most contracts purport to coordi-
nate relations, and every complaint implies a coordination break-
down. But this distinction may be less fundamental than it first 
seems. In a sense, complaints initiate something like a contractual 
relationship; indeed, they trigger a process that often results in a 
formal contractual agreement. They sometimes function just as much 
like contractual offers as like declarations of war. Further, on most 
accounts, contract law over the past century has largely discarded 
those doctrines based on concepts of mutual intent that seem most 
inapplicable to the civil pleading context.173 Questions of contract in-
terpretation are basically questions of the legal effect to be given to 
documents created by private persons, and in this they are much like 
questions of pleading sufficiency. 
 When a contract is silent on an issue, a court asked to enforce the 
contract as to that issue must decide how to resolve it without guid-
ance from contract language. Many, though not all, commentators 
consider such a decision to be a kind of interpretive question; wheth-
er or not it is labeled interpretive, the decision does concern the sig-
nificance the court will give to the contract.174 Much of the commen-
tary on the standards for justifying such decisions evaluates existing 
legal default rules that function to fill such gaps in contract lan-
guage, identifies the systemic effects of such rules, and recommends 
new default rules to address recurring forms of contractual silence.175
 A conclusory allegation resembles a contractual gap. At least in 
theory, such an allegation reproduces the words of a legal standard 
but lacks any language linking the standard to the plaintiff’s specific 
circumstances. Justice Kennedy’s Iqbal opinion suggests that when 
faced with such a gap, a judge should not fill it, but should, rather, 
                                          
 173. See, e.g., Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract 
Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 477 (2000). 
 174. See, e.g., David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of 
Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815 (1991). 
 175. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of 
Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992). For a critical 
assessment, see W. David Slawson, The Futile Search for Principles for Default Rules, 3 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 29 (1994). 
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impose a penalty on the conclusory drafter.176 Yet neither Twombly
nor Iqbal mandates such a penalty default rule. Neither decision, for 
instance, expressly disapproved Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 84, 
which provides that, “The forms in the Appendix [to the Rules] suf-
fice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that 
these rules contemplate.”177 One of these form pleadings, Form 11, 
contains an apparently conclusory allegation of negligence: “On 
<Date>, at <Place>, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle 
against the plaintiff.”178 To the extent this Form includes a “gap” 
concerning the nature of the defendant’s negligence, courts seem to 
remain authorized to fill it. 
 In Iqbal, however, Justice Kennedy declined to fill the gaps in Iq-
bal’s complaint relating to Ashcroft’s and Mueller’s discriminatory 
state of mind.179 Which gaps, then, should a court fill in a complaint? 
In the contract context, arguments about optimal gap-filling rules 
have focused largely on the types of recurring situations in which 
contracts tend to contain gaps and on the systemic consequences of 
resolving that silence in favor of particular types of parties—
particularly consequences relating to incentives to provide infor-
mation in the process of contract formation.180 Taking a similar 
approach in the complaint context would require us to identify the 
types of situations in which complaints tend to contain conclusory 
allegations and the consequences of reading these allegations out of 
complaints or, instead, filling these “gaps” to plaintiffs’ benefit. 
Commentators have already begun to do this, suggesting, for exam-
ple, that allegations of corporate or governmental motive, especially 
in discrimination and civil-rights suits, are more likely than others to 
be necessarily conclusory, since plaintiffs will lack access to the in-
formation they need in order to be more specific.181 But there is a 
need for further systematic work in this area.182
                                          
 176. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text. 
 177. FED. R. CIV. P. 84. 
 178. Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 11. The website for the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts continues to offer the Appendix Forms, including Form 11, as downloadable 
document templates. The website notes, “[g]iven their nature, language in these forms may 
require modification before the document can be filed with the court. Red font is used to 
draw attention to these instances.” Illustrative Civil Rules Forms, UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/RulesAndForms/Illustrative
CivilRulesForms.aspx (last accessed Nov. 18, 2011). 
 179. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text. 
 180. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 174-75. 
 181. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 55, at 32-35. 
 182. Such work could, for example, gather information about the types of cases in 
which complaints tend to contain conclusory allegations (that is allegations repeating 
legal standards verbatim) to determine when, in fact, gaps may be inevitable, thus 
identifying the kinds of claims in which gap-filling in the plaintiff’s favor should at least be 
considered. It could also consider the relative costs imposed on defendants by various 
kinds of conclusory allegations and the corresponding relative costs to plaintiffs and third 
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 This approach to the analysis of “conclusoriness” has limits. In 
particular, some instances of putatively conclusory language may not 
lend themselves to description as “gaps.” The difference of opinion 
between Justices Kennedy and Souter in Iqbal, for instance, was 
more a disagreement about whether the Court should create gaps in 
Iqbal’s complaint than one about whether the Court should fill any 
gaps: Justice Kennedy concluded that some of Iqbal’s allegations 
relating to Ashcroft’s and Mueller’s states of mind should be disre-
garded. From this perspective, the theoretical-doctrinal analogy more 
suited to the analysis of conclusoriness might be the rules against 
“superfluities” in the interpretation of contracts and statutes. 
 2.   The Rule Against Superfluities 
 One of many maxims used to guide and justify judicial interpreta-
tions of statutory law, the “rule against superfluities” in that context 
is based on the polite fiction that a legislature does nothing without a 
purpose183 and the more basic “cardinal rule that statutory language 
must be read in context [since] a phrase gathers meaning from the 
words around it.”184 Also called the “rule against redundancy”185 and 
the “rule against surplusage,”186 this principle parallels an analogous 
rule in contract interpretation187 and directs courts to, where possi-
ble, give statutory text an effect that does not render any words of 
the text meaningless—to construe each statute “so that no part will 
be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.”188 A similar prin-
ciple justifies the “whole act rule,” which “directs that ‘[w]hen “inter-
preting a statute, the court will look not merely to a particular 
clause . . . but will . . . give to [the whole statute] such a construction 
as will carry into execution the will of the Legislature.” ’ ”189
Justice Souter’s dissent in Iqbal cites none of these maxims, but 
his analysis of Iqbal’s complaint is animated by the principle under-
lying them (and underlying Peirce’s, Judge Posner’s, and Professor 
                                                                                                
parties of failing to have gaps resolved in their favor, costs that would vary with the type of 
claim involved. 
 183. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U.S. 250, 258 (2000) (citing Kungys v. United 
States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988)). 
 184. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (citing General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. 
Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 596 (2004); 2A N. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 
46.06, pp. 181-86 (6th rev. ed. 2000)). 
 185. Gutierrez, 528 U.S. at 258. 
 186. Cf. Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004) (citing Chickasaw Nation v. United 
States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001)). 
 187. See sources cited infra note 194. 
 188. Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 101 (quoting 2A N. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 46.06, pp. 181-86 (6th rev. ed. 2000)). 
 189. Hernandez v. Kalinowski, 146 F.3d 196, 200 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Kokozka v. 
Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 194 (1857))). 
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Bone’s respective understandings of interpretation), that is, the idea 
that meaning arises holistically rather than atomistically:  
[The allegations discarded by Justice Kennedy as not plausibly 
suggesting a claim to relief] do not stand alone as the only significant, 
nonconclusory statements in the complaint, for the complaint contains 
many allegations linking Ashcroft and Mueller to the discriminato-
ry practices of their subordinates. . . . The fallacy of the majority’s 
position . . . lies in looking at the relevant assertions in isolation.”190
Justice Souter’s Twombly opinion exhibits a similar concern with 
testing meaning—in that opinion, the meanings of Conley and Rule 
8(a)(2)—by reference to context.191
 Justice Kennedy’s analysis of Iqbal’s complaint, in contrast, ap-
pears to violate the principle. The maxim is not an absolute rule; 
even Justice Souter has recognized that “as one rule of construction 
among many, . . . the rule against redundancy does not necessarily 
have the strength to turn a tide of good cause to come out the other 
way.”192 But ordinarily, a judge offers some alternative justification 
for an interpretation of a text that renders some of its language inop-
erative. Justice Kennedy offers no such justification in his Iqbal
opinion. He merely lists the allegations he deems conclusory and 
observes their linguistic similarity to legal standards.193 Nor does he 
explain why principles of holistic interpretation—which are not lim-
ited doctrinally to statutory interpretation, but are also observed in 
the interpretation of contracts194—would not apply in the context of 
interpreting complaints.  
 More consistent with these familiar principles is the approach of 
the Ninth Circuit in its decision in Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft.195 Like Iqbal,
this case involved claims against John Ashcroft, among others, aris-
ing out of the plaintiff’s detention in the period following September 
11. Abdullah al-Kidd, however, was detained not for immigration 
violations but under the federal material witness statute,196 and he 
asserted claims for direct violation of that statute as well as for viola-
tions of his constitutional rights.197 In considering the sufficiency of 
al-Kidd’s complaint under the Twombly-Iqbal standard, the Ninth 
Circuit did not detach “bare [legal] allegations” resembling those in 
Iqbal’s complaint from other, more concrete allegations, but consid-
                                          
 190. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1960 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 191. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text. 
 192. Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U.S. 250, 258 (2000). 
 193. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. 
 194. See, e.g., Kohler Co. v. Wixen, 555 N.W.2d 640, 644-45 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996); 
Honulik v. Town of Greenwich, 963 A.2d 979, 987 (2009)). 
 195. Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc denied, 598 F.3d 
1129 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 415 (Oct. 18, 2010). 
 196. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006). 
 197. See Al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 955-56. 
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ered the cumulative effect of all these allegations taken together.198
The court expressly rejected as “hypertechnical” a “reading” of the 
complaint urged by Ashcroft in his motion to dismiss and involving a 
disjunctive, allegation-by-allegation analysis akin to Justice Kennedy’s 
in Iqbal.199
 Al-Kidd supplies further reason to think that courts do, indeed, 
approach the interpretation of complaints much as they approach the 
interpretation of other legal instruments, and that they will continue 
to do so under Iqbal. While the canons of statutory and contract con-
struction, including the rule against superfluities, are not without 
their own uncertainties,200 acknowledging the relevance of at least 
linguistic canons to the interpretation of complaints can only advance 
the clarity, stability, and legitimacy of that practice.  
B.   Plausibility and Deference 
 When commentators note that Twombly and Iqbal appear to re-
quire judges to engage in interpretation, they are usually referring 
not to the conclusoriness standard but to the plausibility standard 
introduced by Twombly and reaffirmed by Iqbal.201 The recognition 
that plausibility is “a matter of interpretation,” for many, seems to 
lead directly to the conclusion that there can be no regularity to trial 
courts’ assessments of complaints against this standard. A few skep-
tics have investigated whether the new standards actually have 
made outcomes on motions to dismiss more lopsided or unpredictable. 
Conclusions vary, but most of the evidence suggests that decisional 
patterns have not changed radically, with the possible exception of 
civil rights actions.202
 The idea that district court judges are likely to conform their post- 
to their pre-Iqbal practices is borne out by those judges’ articulations 
of the relevant legal standards in their orders on motions to dismiss. 
The same study discussed above to illustrate how courts have been 
                                          
 198. Id. at 975-76. 
 199. Id. at 975 n.24 (“The paragraph alleging outright violations of § 3144 begins with 
‘the post-9/11 policies and practices,’ with the definite article. (Emphasis added). There is 
no reason from the text of the complaint to think that those ‘post-9/11 policies and 
practices’ are anything other than ‘The post-9/11 material witness policies and practices 
adopted and implemented by Defendant Ashcroft’ alleged fourteen paragraphs earlier in the 
complaint. (Emphasis added).”).  
 200. For skeptical accounts of the canons, see, for example, James J. Brudney & Corey 
Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 1 (2005); Llewellyn, 1950, supra note 152. 
 201. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text. 
 202. See supra note 54; see also, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do
Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2010); Joe S. Cecil et 
al, Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim After Iqbal, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ 
motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf.  
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treating complaints as texts revealed interesting regularities in 
courts’ presentation of their statements of the applicable legal stand-
ard.203 After Twombly, judges in the Southern and Eastern Districts 
of New York largely stopped referring to the Conley “no set of facts” 
formula, as would be expected, but these judges did not stop reciting 
the related standards regarding the assumed truth of allegations and 
the drawing of all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Alongside these 
standards, however, and sometimes in place of them, these judges 
started to explain the relation of “plausibility” to existing legal 
standards.204 After Iqbal, judges stopped referring to the assumed 
truth of the plaintiff’s allegations and began defining plausibility as a 
matter of the inferences reasonably supported by the allegations in a 
complaint, rather than as a territory separated by a boundary from 
other standards.205 Without necessarily noting this detail of district 
court practice, commentators have also been tending to equate plau-
sibility with reasonableness.206
 If the assessment of plausibility requires both interpretation of a 
text and an assessment of the reasonableness of the inferences that 
text supports, then we might usefully look to other situations in 
which judges must assess the reasonable inferences suggested by an 
                                          
 203. Only two of the 136 orders in the sample contain no statement of a legal standard. 
Before Twombly, orders did tend to cite the Conley “no set of facts” standard and the 
related principles that the court should accept all allegations as true and draw all 
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Yet occasionally, even pre-Twombly orders cited 
standards resembling the Iqbal conclusoriness standard. See, e.g., Koleanikov v. Johnson, 
No. CV-05-05206, 2006 WL 2095859 (E.D.N.Y. July 27, 2006); cf., Chapdelaine Corp. Sec. 
& Co. v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., No. 05 Civ. 10711 (SAS), 2006 WL 2020950, at 
*2 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2006) (“[A] complaint ‘[may] not be dismissed on the ground that it is 
conclusory or fails to allege facts.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting In re Initial Public 
Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). 
 204. Some such references focus on the difference between “plausibility” and a 
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heightened fact pleading; others cite the Twombly reference to allegations “nudg[ing]” the 
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New York, No. 07 Civ. 01991(PKC), 2008 WL 2971772, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2008); 
Flaherty v. All Hampton Limousine, Inc., No. 02-CV-4801 (DRH) (WDW), 2008 WL 
2788171, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 2008). 
 205. The Iqbal statement that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1951, 1949 
(2009) (emphasis added), appears in 21 of the 37 2009 S.D.N.Y. orders and 10 of the 11 
2009 E.D.N.Y. orders referenced supra, note 150. In addition, references to “judicial 
experience and common sense,” nonexistent before Iqbal, have become numerous after the 
opinion. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Westlaw assigned no headnote to this part of the 
Iqbal opinion, but cases regularly cite to it. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Republic of Chile, No. 07-
CV-5290 (JS) (ETB), 2009 WL 5255327, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2009); Adelphia Recovery 
Trust v. Bank of Am., N.A., 646 F. Supp. 2d 489, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 206. See, e.g., Huston, supra note 54, at 435 (“[J]udges are . . . likely to read 
‘plausibility’ as imposing something like a requirement that a complaint’s well-pled facts 
‘reasonably’ show a claim to relief.”); Pardo, supra note 8, at 1455 (“[A] complaint is 
‘plausible’ if it presents an explanation of the relevant events that a reasonable jury may 
be able to accept as the best available explanation.”). 
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interpreted text to find hints of how Iqbal may and should be imple-
mented. In a sense, this question does look like the question facing a 
judge asked to decide, on a motion for summary judgment or judg-
ment as a matter of law, what inferences a reasonable jury could 
draw from the evidence.207 But those procedural questions do not re-
quire the judge to focus analysis on a discrete text, as most motions 
to dismiss do. When this aspect of the Iqbal standard is considered, 
an equally valid analogy might be to the standard for judicial review 
of agency interpretations of statutory law, as articulated by the 
Supreme Court in its 1984 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC decision.208
That standard, like Iqbal, involves two steps. In each setting, the 
first step requires analysis of a text (in Chevron, to determine whether 
statutory text clearly speaks to the issue. and in Iqbal, to determine 
whether a complaint contains conclusory allegations). The second 
step involves assessing the reasonableness of inferences from the 
same text (in Chevron, determining whether the agency’s interpreta-
tion is reasonable,209 and in Iqbal, whether the allegations plausibly 
state a claim).  
 The Chevron standard is, of course, controversial in its own 
right.210 The past two decades have seen debate on every detail of the 
standard: when it applies,211 whether its application makes any dif-
ference to the decision of disputes,212and how the two steps relate to 
                                          
 207. This is the approach Professor Pardo takes to reconciling pleading standards with 
other dispositive civil procedural standards. See Pardo, supra note 8. 
 208. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The well-known formulation reads: “First . . . is the question 
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of 
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court . . . must give effect to the 
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L.J. 833 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006). 
 212. See, e.g., Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial 
Decisionmaking, Statutory Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental 
Law, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 767 (2008); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The 
Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations 
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interpretive method and conclusions of ambiguity at step one); Note, “How Clear Is Clear” 
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one another (as well as whether they are even distinct).213 These 
questions parallel those debated in the commentary on Twombly and 
Iqbal: namely, whether their standards apply to all cases, whether 
those standards will make a difference to outcomes, and how the 
standards should be applied in particular cases.214 But the parallels 
do not extend to the terms in which these issues are considered in 
each context. In the Chevron setting, the emphasis is on basic issues 
of legal interpretation: On what interpretive issues is a federal judge 
more likely to reach a defensible conclusion than an administrative 
agency? By what standards should the defensibility of an interpreta-
tion be judged? When should a court conclude it has an obligation to 
defer to a party’s account of what a text means? In the pleading set-
ting, so far, no similar questions have been considered. Rather, most 
commentators seem to assume that no standards for assessing the 
defensibility of interpretive conclusions exist, so that implementation 
of Iqbal must be evaluated in terms of outcomes alone, without refer-
ence to the matter presented in complaints. 
 Reluctance to use Chevron as a model for thinking about pleading 
scrutiny may stem from the apparently divergent presumptions and 
policies underlying the two standards. Chevron is widely understood 
as a principle of deference justified on separation-of-powers 
grounds.215 The plausibility standard, in contrast, is regarded as a 
reversal of Conley’s pleader-favoring presumption.216 These presump-
tions, however, are explicit components of only the second step of 
each standard. In the Chevron context, courts do not extend the pre-
sumption of deference to their analysis of the text alone.217 This prac-
tice provides at least an analytic model for assessing conclusoriness 
free of any presumptions about the sufficiency of a pleading. Moreover, 
to the extent that both the second step of Chevron and the plausibil-
ity standard rest on the assessment of reasonable inferences, Chev-
ron supplies a framework for arguments moderating the apparently 
plaintiff-unfriendly presumption of the pleading standard. Just as 
reasonableness in the Chevron context is assessed against the back-
drop of assumptions about legislative delegation and agency exper-
                                                                                                
in Chevron’s Step One?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1687, 1708 (2005) (“[A]part from a very few 
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 214. See supra Parts II.A and II.B. 
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 217. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 212, at 53; Note, supra note 212, at 1708. 
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tise, so should reasonableness in the pleading context be assessed 
against the delegation model inherent in the party-driven adversary 
system erected by the Federal Rules and the related assumption of 
the parties’ expertise with respect to factual questions. 
 More generally, there is no reason to think it would be any more 
difficult to conceive of standards for the interpretation of complaints 
than it is to conceive of standards for the interpretation of statutes. 
The assumption to the contrary is an artifact of Clark’s vision of civil 
pleading. We might make real progress if we admitted the limits of 
this vision and again candidly confronted district courts’ inevitably 
interpretive task in screening pleadings, as Iqbal prompts us to.  
V. CONCLUSION
 Understanding Iqbal fully requires us to reexamine the story we 
have told for nearly a century about the development of civil pleading 
doctrine. An early twentieth-century invention, that story takes 
pleading review in its best and most advanced form to have nothing 
to do with the close scrutiny of text. Iqbal has discomfited so many 
mainly because this story, the source of the present-day vocabulary 
for discussing civil pleading, encouraged an impoverished conceptual-
ization of the treatment of civil complaints. But the story’s grip on us 
is largely a matter of historical contingencies, not its fundamental 
accuracy. From this perspective, Iqbal might indeed have turned 
back the pleading clock, but in so doing, it has also reinvigorated 
important concepts that lawyers of past generations correctly per-
ceived as lying close to the core of pragmatic thought and standard 
understandings of civil pleading. Effective reform of civil pleading 
practices requires confronting these issues, not denying them, and we 
have all the tools we need to get started on the task. 
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